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Abstract
In this paper, we give quantum algorithms for two fundamental computation problems: solv-
ing polynomial systems over finite fields and optimization where the arguments of the objective
function and constraints take values from a finite field or a bounded interval of integers. The
quantum algorithms can solve these problems with any given success probability and have poly-
nomial runtime complexities in the size of the input, the degree of the inequality constraints, and
the condition number of certain matrices derived from the problem. So, we achieved exponential
speedup for these problems when their condition numbers are small. As applications, quantum
algorithms are given to three basic computational problems in cryptography: the polynomial sys-
tem with noise problem, the short integer solution problem, the shortest vector problem, as well
as the cryptanalysis for the lattice based NTRU cryptosystem. It is shown that these problems
and NTRU can against quantum computer attacks only if their condition numbers are large,
so the condition number could be used as a new criterion for the lattice based post-quantum
cryptosystems.
Keywords. Quantum algorithm, polynomial system solving, integer programming, finite field,
polynomial system with noise, short integer solution problem, shortest vector problem, crypt-
analysis of NTRU, (0,1)-programming, D-Wave.
1 Introduction
Solving polynomial systems and optimization over finite fields are fundamental computation prob-
lems in mathematics and computer science, which are also typical NP hard problems. In this
paper, we give quantum algorithms to these problems, which could be exponential faster than the
traditional methods under certain conditions.
∗The work is supported by grants NKRDPC No. 2018YFA0306702 and NSFC No. 11688101.
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1.1 Main results
Let Fq be a finite field, where q = p
m for a prime number p and m ∈ N≥1. Let F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂
Fq[X] be a set of polynomials in variables X = {x1, . . . , xn} and with total sparseness TF =
∑r
i=1#fi,
where #f denotes the number of terms in f . For ǫ ∈ (0, 1), we show that
Theorem 1.1. There is a quantum algorithm which decides whether F = 0 has a solution in Fnq
and computes one if F = 0 does have solutions in Fnq , with success probability at least 1 − ǫ and
complexity O˜(T 3.5F D
3.5m5.5 log4.5 pκ2 log 1/ǫ), where D = n+
∑n
i=1⌊log2maxj degxifj⌋, TF is the
total sparseness of F , and κ is the condition number of F (see Theorem 3.13 for definition).
The complexity of a quantum algorithm is the number of quantum gates needed to solve the
problem. Since TF ,D, log pm are smaller than the input size, the complexity of the algorithm is
polynomial in the input size and the condition number, which means that we can solve polyno-
mial systems over finite fields using quantum computers with any given success probability and in
polynomial-time if the condition number κ of F is small, say when κ is poly(n,D).
We also give a quantum algorithm to solve the following optimization problem.
min
X∈Fnp ,Y∈Zm
o(X,Y) subject to
fj(X) = 0 mod p, j = 1, . . . , r; (1)
0 ≤ gi(X,Y) ≤ bi, i = 1, . . . , s; 0 ≤ yk ≤ uk, k = 1, . . . ,m,
where F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ Fp[X], Y = {y1, . . . , ym}, Go = {o, g1, . . . , gs} ⊂ Z[X,Y], and b1, . . . , bs,
u1, . . . , um ∈ N. The complexity of the algorithm is polynomial in the size of the input, deg(gi),
deg(o), and the condition number of the problem (see Theorem 5.4 for definition). Since Problem
1 is NP-hard, the algorithm gives an exponential speedup over traditional methods if the condition
number is small, say poly(n,m).
Note that for q = p, Problem (1) includes polynomial system solving over Fq as a special case.
Problem (1) is meaningless for Fq with q = p
m and m > 1, since Fq cannot be embedded into Z.
We apply our methods to three computational problems widely used in cryptography: the
polynomial systems with noise problem (PSWN) [2, 17, 20], the short integer solution problem (SIS)
[1], the shortest vector problem (SVP) [4, 23, 6]. We also show how to recover the private keys for
the latticed based cryptosystem NTRU with our algorithm. The complexity for solving all of these
problems is polynomial in the input size and their condition numbers.
The latticed based computational problems SVP and LWE are the bases for 23 of the 69 sub-
missions for the call by NIST to standardize the post-quantum public-key encryption systems [4].
LWE is another important problem in cryptography and can be reduced to the SIS problem [25].
In theory, our results imply that the 23 proposed cryptosystems can against the attack of quantum
computers only if the related condition numbers are large. So, the condition number could be used
as a new criterion for lattice based post-quantum cryptosystems.
Let p be a prime and F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ Fp[X] with r ≫ n. The PSWN is to find an X ∈ Fnp
which satisfies the maximal number of equations in F . The problem is also called MAX-POSSO
[2, 20]. Our quantum algorithm for PSWN has complexity O˜(n3.5T 3.5F log
8 pκ2), where κ is the
condition number of the problem. The PSWN is very hard in the sense that, even for the linear
system with noise (LSWN) over Fp, to find an X satisfying more than 1/p of the equations is NP
hard [17, 30].
2
Lattice-based cryptography began in 1996 with a seminal work by Ajtai [1], who presented a
family of one-way functions based on the SIS. The SIS problem is to find a solution of a homogenous
linear system AX = 0 mod p for A ∈ Fr×np , such that ||X̂||2 is smaller than a given bound. Our
quantum algorithm for SIS has complexity O˜((n log p+ r)2.5(TA log p+n log
2 p)κ2), where TA is the
number of nonzero elements in A and κ is the condition number of the problem.
The SVP and CVP are two basic NP-hard problems widely used in cryptography. The SVP
is to find a nonzero vector with the smallest Euclidean norm in a lattice in Rm. The CVP is
to find a vector in a lattice, which is closest to a given vector. The SIS [1] and LWE [25] are the
randomized versions of SVP and CVP, respcetively. Our quantum algorithm for SVP has complexity
O˜(m(n7.5+m2.5)(n3+log h) log4.5 hκ2), where n is the rank of the lattice, h is the maximal value in
the generators of the lattice, and κ is the condition number of the problem. Our quantum algorithm
for CVP has a similar complexity.
NTRU is a lattice-based public key cryptosystem proposed by Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman
[19], which is one of the most promising candidates for post-quantum cryptosystems. Our quantum
algorithm can be used to recover the private key from the public key in time O˜(N4.5 log4.5 qκ2) for
an NTRU with parameters (N, p, q) with q > p. In particular, we show that the three versions
of NTRU recommended in [19] have the desired security against quantum computers only if their
condition numbers are large.
1.2 Main idea of the algorithm
Let F ⊂ C[X] be a set of polynomials over C. A solution of F is called Boolean if its components
are either 0 or 1. Similarly, a variable x is called a Boolean variable if it satisfies x2 − x = 0. In
[12], we give a quantum algorithm1 to find Boolean solutions of a polynomial system over C, which
is called B-POSSO in the rest of this paper. The main idea of the quantum algorithms proposed in
this paper is to reduce the problem to be solved to B-POSSO, under the condition that the number
of variables and the total sparseness of the new polynomial system is polynomial in the size of the
original polynomial system.
Our algorithm for problem (1) consists of three main steps: (1) The equational constraints
fj(X) = 0 mod p, j = 1, . . . , r are reduced into polynomial equations in Boolean variables over C.
(2) The inequality constraints 0 ≤ gi(X,Y) ≤ bi, i = 1, . . . , s are reduced into polynomial equations
in Boolean variables over C. (3) The problem of finding the minimal value of the objective function
is reduced several B-POSSOs. We will give a brief introduction to each of these three steps below.
A key method used in our algorithm is to use a polynomial in Boolean variables to represent
the integers 0, 1 . . . , b for b ∈ Z>1. Let θb(Gbit) =
∑⌊log2 b⌋−1
k=0 Gk2
k+(b+1− 2⌊log2 b⌋)G⌊log2 b⌋, where
Gbit = {G0, . . . , G⌊log
2
b⌋} is a set of Boolean variables. Then, the values of θb(Gbit) are exactly
0, 1 . . . , b.
For F ⊂ Fp[X] and Fp = {0, 1, . . . , p− 1}, we use three steps to reduce the problem of finding a
solution of F in Fp to a B-POSSO. (1) F is reduced to a quadratic polynomial system (MQ) F1 by
introducing new variables. (2) Each variable in F1 is expanded as xi = θp−1(Xi) and F1 is reduced
to another MQ F2 in Boolean variables Xi = {Xij , j = 0, . . . , ⌊log2(p− 1)⌋}. Since F1 is quadratic,
the total sparseness of F2 is well controlled. (3) We obtain a polynomial over C from F2 as follows
1No knowledge of quantum algorithm is needed to read this paper. What we do is to use traditional methods to
reduce the problems to be solved to this result.
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F3 = {g − θ#g(Ug)p | g ∈ F2}, where Ug is a set of Boolean variables. It is shown that solutions
of F in Fp can be recovered from Boolean solutions of F3, which can be found with the quantum
algorithm from [12].
We also reduce an inequality constraint 0 ≤ g(X,Y) ≤ b for g ∈ Z[X,Y] and b ∈ Z>0 into a
B-POSSO. There exist X and Y such that 0 ≤ g(X,Y) ≤ b if and only if g(Y,Y) − θb(Gg) = 0
has a solution for X, Y, and Gg, where Gg is a set of Boolean variables. We reduce g(Y,Y) into
a polynomial in Boolean variables by first reducing g(Y,Y) into an MQ and then expanding the
variables into Boolean variables by using the θ function. Let d be the degree of gi. Then the values
of gi is exponential in d and hence the number of Boolean variables needed is polynomial in d. This
is why the complexity of the algorithm depends on d.
Since all variables are bounded, the objective function o is also bounded, and we can assume
o ∈ [0, u) for some u ∈ N. We design a novel search scheme to reduce the minimization of o(Y,Y) ∈
[0, u) to several B-POSSOs. The minimal value of o is found by bisecting the feasible interval [0, u)
recursively into subintervals of the form [α, 2β) and deciding whether o ∈ [α, 2β) has a solution,
which is equivalent to solving the equation o− (α +∑β−1j=0 Hj2j) = 0 for Boolean variables Hj . As
a consequence, we can find the minimal value of o by solving several B-POSSOs.
1.3 Relation with existing work
Problem (1) includes many important problems as special cases, such as the polynomial system solv-
ing over finite fields [14], PSWN [2, 17, 20, 30], SIS [1], SVP/CVP [4, 23, 6], the (0, 1)-programming
problem [16], the quadratic unconstrained binary optimization problem which is the mathemati-
cal problem that can be solved by the D-Wave System [21], which are all important computation
problems and were widely studied.
Comparing to the existing work, our algorithm has two major advantages. First, we give a
universal approach to a very general problem. Second, the complexity of our algorithm is polynomial
in the inputs size, the degree of the inequalities, and the condition number of the problem. Since
the problems under consideration are NP hard, existing algorithms are exponential in some of the
parameters such as the number of variables. In this aspect, we give a new way of looking at these
NP hard problems by reducing the computational difficulty to the size of the condition number.
Our algorithm is based on the quantum algorithm to solve B-POSSOs proposed in [12], which
in turn is based on the HHL quantum algorithm and its variants to solve linear systems [18, 5, 13].
Comparing to the HHL algorithm, we can give the exact solution, while the HHL algorithm can
only give the quantum state. The speedup of our algorithms comes from the HHL algorithm. The
limitation on the condition number is inherited from the HHL algorithm, and it is proved in [18] that
the dependence on condition number cannot be substantially improved. Also note that, the best
classic numerical method for solving an order N linear equation Ax = b has complexity O˜(N
√
κ),
which also depends on the condition number κ of A [26].
The method of treating the inequality constraints with the function θb(Gbit) simplifies the com-
putational significantly. The binary representation ηb =
∑⌊log2(b)⌋
i=0 Bi2
i for b is often used in the
literature to represent the integers 0, 1, . . . , b. The values of ηb is 0, 1, . . . , 2
⌊log2(b)⌋+1−1, which may
contain integers strictly larger than b and cannot be used to represent inequalities. In [7, 3], the
inequality 0 ≤ g ≤ b is reduced to ∏bi=0(g − i) = 0. Our reduction θb(Gbit) is better, which does
not increase the degree of the equation and the size of the equation is increased in the logarithm
scale, while the method used in [7, 3] increases the degree by a factor b and increases the size of the
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equation exponentially.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the θb(Gbit) function and
give an explicit formula to reduce a polynomial system into an MQ. In Section 3, we present the
algorithm for solving polynomial systems over finite fields. In Section 4, we show how to reduce
the inequality constraints in problem (1) to a B-POSSO. In Section 5, we present the algorithm for
solving problem (1). In Section 6, we present a quantum algorithm for PSWN. In Section 7, we
present a quantum algorithm for SIS. In Section 8, we present a quantum algorithm for SVP/CVP.
In Section 9, we present a quantum algorithm to recover the private key for NTRU. In Section 10,
conclusions are given.
2 Two basic reductions
In this section, we give two basic reductions frequently used in the paper: to represent an integer
interval with a Boolean polynomial and to reduce a polynomial system to an MQ.
2.1 Represent an integer interval with a Boolean polynomial
A variable X is called a Boolean variable if it satisfies X2−X = 0. In this paper, we use uppercase
symbols to represent Bollean variables. A polynomial is called a Boolean polynomial if it is in a
set of Boolean variables. In this section, we will construct a Boolean polynomial whose values are
exactly the integers 0, 1, . . . , b for a given positive integer b > 0.
Set s = ⌊log2(b)⌋ and introduce s + 1 Boolean variables Bbit = {B0, . . . , Bs}. Inspired by
b = (2s − 1) + (b+ 1− 2s), we introduce the function θb(Bbit): θ1(Bbit) = G0 and for b > 1
θb(Bbit) =
s−1∑
i=0
2iBi + (b+ 1− 2s)Bs. (2)
Lemma 2.1. When evaluated in C or Fp = {0, 1, . . . , p−1} with p > b, θb(Bbit) is a surjective map
from {0, 1}s+1 to {0, 1, . . . , b}. Furthermore, #Bbit = #θb(Bbit) = ⌊log2(b)⌋ + 1.
Proof. We first assume that θb(Bbit) is evaluated over C. It is easy to check this lemma when
b = 1. When b > 1, from the definition of s, we have b/2 < 2s ≤ b and hence 2s − 1 < b.
Since the values of
∑s−1
i=0 2
iBi are 0, 1, . . . , 2
s − 1, for any integer n ∈ [0, 2s − 1], n has a preimage
of map θb(Bbit), where Bs = 0. Now consider an integer n ∈ [2s, b]. Since n ≥ 2s, we have
n−(b+1−2s) ≥ 2·2s−b−1 > 2·b/2+1−b−1 > −1 ≥ 0. Since n ≤ b, we have n−(b+1−2s) ≤ 2s−1.
Thus 0 ≤ n− (b+ 1− 2s) ≤ 2s − 1, and then n has a preimage of map θb(Bbit), where Bs = 1. It is
clear #Bbit = ⌊log2(b)⌋ + 1. Since b+ 1− 2s > 0, we have #θb(Bbit) = ⌊log2(b)⌋+1. The lemma is
also valid when θb(Bbit) is evaluated over Fp, since all values in the computation are ≤ p− 1.
For instance, θ6(Bbit) = B0+2B1+3B2, θ7(Bbit) = B0+2B1+4B2, θ8(Bbit) = B0+2B1+4B2+B3.
Remark 2.2. It is easy to check that θb is injective if and only if b = 2
k − 1 for some positive
integer k. For instance, θ6 is not injective: 3 has two preimages B0 = 1, B1 = 1, B2 = 0 and
B0 = 0, B1 = 0, B2 = 1.
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2.2 Reduce polynomial system to MQ
It is well known that a polynomial system can be reduced to an MQ by introducing some new
indeterminates. In this section, we give an explicit reduction which is needed in the complexity
analysis in this paper.
For any field F , let F [X] be the polynomial ring over F in the indeterminates X = {x1, . . . , xn}.
Denote the sparseness (number of terms) of f ∈ F [X] as #f . For F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ F [X], denote
TF =
∑r
i=1#fi to be the total sparseness of F , NF = #X = n to be the number of indeterminates
in F , di = maxj degxi(fj) to be the degree of F in xi, M(F) to be the set of all monomials in F ,
and C(F) to be the size of the coefficients of the polynomials in F , (F)F [X] to be the ideal generated
by F in F [X].
We want to introduce some new indeterminates to rewrite F as an MQ.
Lemma 2.3. Let F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ F [X]. We can introduce a set of new indeterminates V
and an MQ Q(F) ⊂ F [X,V] such that (F)F [X] = (Q(F))F [X,V] ∩ F [X]. Furthermore, we have
#V = (TF +1)
∑n
i=1⌊log2 di⌋+nTF = O(TFD), NQ(F) = n+#V = O(TFD), #Q(F) = r+#V =
O(TFD), TQ(F) = TF +2#V = O(TFD), and C(Q(F)) = C(F), where D = n+
∑n
i=1⌊log2 di⌋ and
di = maxj degxi(fj).
Proof. If F is already an MQ, set Q(F) = F and V = ∅. First, we introduce new indeterminates
uij for j = 1, . . . , ⌊log2 di⌋ and new polynomials ui1−x2i and ui(j+1)−u2ij for j = 2, . . . , ⌊log2 di⌋−1.
It is clear that x2
j
i = uij . Without loss of generality, we assume di ≥ 2 and if di ≤ 1, then we do
not need these uij . Let X
α =
∏n
i=1 x
αi
i be a monomial of F , and αi =
∑li
k=1 2
νik be the binary
representation of αi ≤ di, where li ≤ ⌊log2 αi⌋+ 1 ≤ ⌊log2 di⌋+ 1 and νi1 < · · · < νili . Thus
X
α =
n∏
i=1
x
∑li
k=1 2
νik
i =
n∏
i=1
li∏
k=1
x2
νik
i ≡
n∏
i=1
li∏
k=1
uiνik .
Rewrite these {uij} as {ui | i = 1, . . . , Lα} and we have Xα =
∏Lα
i=1 ui, where Lα =
∑
k lk ≤∑n
i=1(⌊log2 di⌋ + 1) ≤
∑n
i=1⌊log2 di⌋ + n. To rewrite this product as an MQ, we introduce new
indeterminates {v1, . . . , vLα−2} and quadratic polynomials v1−u1u2, vi−vi−1ui+1 for i = 2, . . . , Lα−
2 and Xα = vLα−2uLα . Denote Q(Xα) = {v1 − u1u2, vi − vi−1ui+1, i = 2, . . . , Lα − 2}. Finally, we
obtain an MQ
Q(F) = {ui1 − x2i , ui(ki+1) − u2iki , i = 1, . . . , n, ki = 2, . . . , ⌊log2 di⌋ − 1;
f̂j, j = 1, . . . , r} ∪Xα∈M(F) Q(Xα) ⊂ F [X,V], (3)
where V = {ui, vk} and f̂i is obtained by replacing Xα by vLα−2uLα in fi. For convenience, we
denote
Q̂(fj) = f̂j, j = 1, . . . , r. (4)
Let V = {ui, vk} be the set of new indetermiantes. It is clear that the number of these uij is∑n
i=1⌊log2 di⌋. To represent Xα, we need
∑n
i=1 li−2 ≤
∑n
i=1⌊log2 di⌋+n new indeterminates vi. In
total, we have #V ≤∑ni=1⌊log2 di⌋+ TF (∑ni=1 li − 2) ≤ (TF + 1)∑ni=1⌊log2 di⌋+ nTF = O(TFD).
Then,NQ(F) = #X+#V = O(TFD), since n ≤ D. #Q(F) = r+#V = O(TFD), since r ≤ D. Q(F)
contains r polynomials Q̂(fj), j = 1, . . . , r and #V binomials. Then TQ(F) = TF +2#V = O(TFD).
Since we only introduce new coefficients ±1, we have C(Q(F)) = C(F).
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Example 2.4. Let F = {f1 = x31x52 + 2x71x52 + 3}. We have d1 = 7, d2 = 5, and Q1 = {u11 −
x21, u12−u211, u21−x22, u22−u221}. Then x31x52 = x1u11x2u22 = v2u22, x71x52 = x1u11u12x2u22 = v5u22,
where Q2 = {v1 − x1u11, v2 − x2v1, v3 − x1u11, v4 − v3u12, v5 − v4x2}. Finally, Q(F) = Q1 ∪ Q2 ∪
{v2u22 + 2v5u22 + 3}. Note that the above representation is not optimal and we can use less new
variables to represent f1 = x1v2 + 2x1v2x
4
1 + 3 = x1v2 + 2x1v
′
3 + 3, where v
′
3 = v2u12.
Remark 2.5. As mentioned in Example 2.4, the representation for Q(F) is not optimal. The
binary decision diagram (BDD) [11] can be used to give a better representation for Q(F) by using
less variables vi.
3 Polynomial system solving over finite fields
Let F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ Fq[X] be a finite set of polynomials over the finite field Fq, ti = #fi, and
TF =
∑r
i=1 ti. In this section, we give a quantum algorithm to find a solution of F in Fnq . Denote
the solutions of F in Fnq by VFq(F). For a prime number p, we use the standard representation
Fp = {0, . . . , p− 1}.
3.1 Reduce MQ over Fp to MQ in Boolean variables over C
Let F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ Fp[X] be an MQ, ti = #fi, and TF =
∑r
i=1 ti. In this section, we will
construct a set of Boolean polynomials over C, from which we can obtain VFp(F). The reduction
procedure consists of the following two steps.
Step 1. We reduce F to a set of polynomials in Boolean variables over Fp. If p = 2, then the
xi are already Boolean and we can skip this step. We thus assume p > 2 and set
xi = θp−1(Xi) =
⌊log2(p−1)⌋−1∑
j=0
Xi,j2
j + (p− 2⌊log2(p−1)⌋)Xi,⌊log2(p−1)⌋,
Xi = {Xij , j = 1, . . . , ⌊log2(p − 1)⌋}, (5)
Xbit = ∪ni=1Xi = {Xij | i = 1, . . . , n, j = 0, . . . , ⌊log2(p− 1)⌋}.
where θp−1 is defined in (2) and Xij are Boolean variables. Let fi =
∑ti
j=1 ci,jX
αij , where αij =
(αij(1), . . . , αij(n)) ∈ Nn. Substituting (5) into F , we have
fibit =
ti∑
j=1
ci,j
n∏
k=1
(θp−1(Xi))αij (k) ∈ Fp[Xi], (6)
B(F) = {f1bit, . . . , frbit} ⊂ Fp[Xbit].
For any set S, set
HS = {x2 − x |x ∈ S}.
We have
Lemma 3.1. There is a surjective morphism Π1 : VFp(B(F),HXbit) ⇒ VFp(F), where Π1(Xbit)
= (θp−1(X1), . . . , θp−1(Xn)). Furthermore, #Xbit = O(n log p) and the total sparseness of B(F) is
O(TF log2 p).
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Proof. By Lemma 2.1, it is easy to check that Π1 is surjective. By Lemma 2.1, #θp−1(Xi) =
⌊log2(p − 1)⌋ + 1 and hence #Xbit = O(n log p). Since F is an MQ, for any monomial Xαij of fi,
we have |αij | ≤ 2 and
∏n
k=1(θp−1(Xi))
αij (k) in (6) has at most O(log2 p) terms. Therefore, the total
sparseness of fibit is O(#fi log
2 p) and the total sparseness of B(F) is O(TF log2 p).
Step 2. We introduce new Boolean indeterminates Ui,j and reduce each fibit into a Boolean
polynomial over Z. Let t′i = #fibit and let
Ui = {Ui,j , j = 0, . . . , ⌊log2 t′i⌋},
Ubit = ∪ri=1Ui = {Ui,j | i = 1, . . . , r, j = 0, . . . , ⌊log2 t′i⌋}, (7)
θt′i(Ui) =
⌊log2 t′i⌋−1∑
j=0
Ui,j2
j + (t′i + 1− 2⌊log2 t
′
i⌋)Ui,⌊log2 t′i⌋ ∈ Fp[Ui], (8)
P (fibit) = fibit − pθt′i(Ui) ∈ Z[Xbit,Ui],
P (F) = {P (fibit) | i = 1, . . . , r} ⊂ Z[Xbit,Ubit], (9)
and we have
Lemma 3.2. There is a surjective morphism Π2 : VC(P (F),HXbit ,HUbit)⇒ VFp(F), where
Π2(Xbit,Ubit) = Π1(Xbit) = (θp−1(X1), . . . , θp−1(Xn)).
Proof. Let (Xˇbit, Uˇbit) ∈ VC(P (F),HXbit ,HUbit). Then (Xˇbit, Uˇbit) is a Boolean solution of P (F) ⊂
Z[Xbit,Ubit] and
0 = P (fi)(Xˇbit, Uˇbit) = fibit(Xˇbit)− pθ⌊Ci/p⌋(Uˇbit) ≡ fibit(Xˇbit) ≡ fi(Π1(Xˇbit)) (mod p),
where the last equivalence comes from (6), and Π1(Xˇbit) = (θp−1(Xˇ1), . . . , θp−1(Xˇn)) is defined in
Lemma 3.1. As a conclusion, fi(Π(Xˇbit)) ≡ 0 (mod p), or (θp−1(Xˇ1), . . . , θp−1(Xˇn)) ∈ VFp(F).
We now prove that Π2 is surjective. By Lemma 3.1, VFp(B(F),HXbit)⇒ VFp(F), so it is enough
to prove VC(P (F),HXbit ,HUbit) ⇒ VFp(B(F),HXbit). Let Xˇbit ∈ VFp(B(F),HXbit) and fibit =∑t′i
j=1 c
′
i,jX
βij
bit ∈ Fp[Xbit], where c′i,j ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1} ⊂ Z. Denote Ci =
∑t′i
j=1 c
′
i,j ≤ (p− 1)t′i. Then,
fibit(Xˇbit) ≡ 0 (mod p) if and only if fibit(Xˇbit) = 0, p, 2p, . . . , or t′ip, since ⌊Ci/p⌋p ≤ t′i. By Lemma
2.1, there exist Boolean variables Uˇi = {Uˇi,j , j = 0, . . . , ⌊log2 t′i⌋} such that fibit(Xˇbit) = pθt′i(Uˇi).
Hence (Xˇbit, Uˇi) is a preimage of Xˇbit for the map VC(P (F),HXbit ,HUbit) ⇒ VFp(B(F),HXbit).
Then, the map Π2 is surjective.
Since the map in (5) is not injective, this map Π2 is also not injective.
Lemma 3.3. The polynomial system P (F) defined in (9) is of total sparseness TP (F) = O˜(TF log2 p)
and has NP (F) = O(n log p+
∑r
i=1 log ti+r log log p) indeterminates. Furthermore, we can compute
P (F) from F in O˜(TF log2 p) binary operations.
Proof. By Lemma 3.1, B(F) is of total sparseness O(TF log2 p) and has O(n log p) indeterminates.
Since F is an MQ, by the proof of Lemma 3.1, we have t′i = #fi,bit ≤ ti log2 p. Then, the number of
Ui,j introduces in (7) is #Ubit =
∑r
i=1⌊log2 t′i⌋ = O(
∑r
i=1 log t
′
i) = O(
∑r
i=1(log ti + log(log p)
2)) =
O(
∑r
i=1 log ti + r log log p). Therefore, the total number of indeterminates is #Xbit + #Ubit =
O(n log p+
∑r
i=1 log ti + r log log p).
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From (9), the total sparseness of P (F) is TP (F) = TB(F) +
∑r
i=1#θt′i(Ui) = TB(F) + #Ubit =
O(TF log2 p+
∑r
i=1 log ti+r log log p) = O˜(TF log
2 p), since r ≤ TF and
∑r
i=1 log ti ≤
∑r
i=1 ti = TF .
To compute each 2j mod p costs O(log p) binary operations. Using the fast polynomial arith-
metics [28], to expand all the polynomials in B(F) costs O˜(TF log2 p) binary operations. The cost
of other steps to obtain P (F) is negligible.
Corollary 3.4. If F is a linear system, then TP (F) = O(TF log p) and NP (F) = O˜(n log p +∑r
i=1 log ti + r log log p).
Proof. Since each fi is linear, we have TB(F) = O(TF log p), and TP (F) = O(TF log p + #Ubit) =
O˜(TF log p).
Remark 3.5. In (8), we can use θ⌊Ci/p⌋ instead of θt′i to introduce less indeterminates. To compute
each Ci =
∑t′i
j=1 c
′
ij costs t
′
i log p = O(ti log
3 p), and to compute all Ci costs O(TF log3 p), which is
more than TP (F) = O(TF log2 p). But, this is negligible comparing to the final complexity of the
algorithm in Corollary 3.9.
3.2 Solving polynomial systems over Fp
Let F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ Fp[X]. By Lemma 2.3, we can convert F into an MQ Q(F) ⊂ Fp[X,V]. By
Lemma 3.2, we can convert Q(F) to an MQ in Boolean variables over C: P (Q(F)) ⊂ C[Xbit,Vbit,Ubit].
To solve P (Q(F)), we need the following result, where a quantum algorithm for B-POSSO is given.
A solution a of B ⊂ C[X] is called a Boolean solution if each coordinate of a is either 0 or 1.
Theorem 3.6 ([12]). For a finite set B ⊂ C[X] and ǫ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a quantum algorithm
QBoolSol which decides whether B = 0 has a Boolean solution and computes one if B = 0 does
have Boolean solutions, with probability at least 1−ǫ and complexity O˜(n2.5(n+TB)κ2 log 1/ǫ), where
TB the total sparseness of B and κ is the condition number of B.
Here is the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.7. For F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ Fp[X] and ǫ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a quantum algorithm
to find a solution of F in Fp with probability at least 1 − ǫ and the complexity of the algorithm
is O˜(T 3.5F D
3.5 log4.5 pκ2 log 1/ǫ), where TF =
∑r
i=1#fi is the total sparseness of F , D = n +∑n
i=1maxj⌊log2(degxi(fj))⌋, and κ is the condition number of P (Q(F)), also called the condition
number of F .
We first estimate the total sparseness of P (Q(F)).
Lemma 3.8. P (Q(F)) is of total sparseness O(TFD log2 p) = O(nTF log d log2 p) and has O(TF
D log p) = O(nTF log d log p) indeterminates, where D = n +
∑n
i=1maxj⌊log2(degxi(fj))⌋ and d =
max{2, log2(degxi(fj)), i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , r}.
Proof. By Lemma 2.3, NQ(F) = O(TFD), TQ(F) = O(TFD), and #Q(F) = O(TFD). By Lemma
3.3, P (Q(F)) is of total sparseness O(TFD log2 p). By Lemma 3.3, P (Q(F)) has NP (Q(F)) =
O(NQ(F) log p +
∑
f∈Q(F) log(#f) + #Q(F) log log p) indeterminates. From the proof of Lemma
2.3, Q(F) contains f̂j, j = 1, . . . , r and #V binomials. Then,
∑
f∈Q(F) log(#f) =
∑r
j=1 log(#f̂j) +
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#V log 2 = O(
∑r
j=1 log tj+TFD) = O˜(TFD). ThenNP (Q(F)) = O˜(TFD log p+TFD+TFD log log p) =
O˜(TFD log p). Since D = n +
∑n
i=1maxj⌊log2(degxi(fj))⌋ = O(n log d), we obtain the bounds in-
volving n and d.
Proof of Theorem 3.7. We can find a solution of F as follows. Construct P (Q(F)) ⊂ C[Xbit,Vbit,
Ubit] according to Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 3.2. Let b =QBoolSol(P (Q(F)), ǫ). If b = ∅ then the al-
gorithm fails to find a solutioon. Let b = (Xˇbit, Vˇbit, Uˇbit) and Xˇbit = (Xˇ1,0, . . . , Xˇ1,⌊log2(p−1)⌋), Xˇ2,0,
. . . , Xˇn,⌊log2(p−1)⌋)). Let X̂ = (θp−1(Xˇ1), . . . , θp−1(Xˇn)), where Xˇi = (Xˇi,0, . . . , Xˇi,⌊log2(p−1)⌋). By
Lemma 2.3, Lemma 3.2, and Theorem 3.6, X̂ is a solution of F in Fp with probability at least 1− ǫ.
We now give the complexity. By Lemma 3.8, P (Q(F)) is of sparseness O(TFD log2 p) and
has O(TFD log p) indeterminates. By Theorem 3.6, we can find a Boolean solution of P (Q(F))
in time O˜((TFD log p)2.5(TFD log p + TFD log2 p)κ2 log 1/ǫ) = O˜(T 3.5F D
3.5 log4.5 pκ2 log 1/ǫ). The
complexity for other steps can be neglected.
Let d = max{2,maxni=1maxj degxi(fj)}. Then D = O(n log d). Since the solutions are in Fp, we
can assume d < p. By Theorem 3.7, we have
Corollary 3.9. The complexity to find a solution for F = 0 mod p is O˜(n3.5T 3.5F log3.5 d log4.5 p
κ2 log 1/ǫ) = O˜(n3.5T 3.5F log
8 pκ2 log 1/ǫ).
Corollary 3.10. If F is an MQ, then the complexity is O˜((n log p+ r)2.5TF log2 pκ2 log 1/ǫ).
Proof. If F is an MQ, we have P (Q(F)) = P (F). By Lemma 3.3, NP (F) = O(n log p+
∑r
i=1 log ti+
r log log p) and TP (F) = O(TF log2 p) > NP (F). Since
∑r
i=1 log ti = log(
∏r
i=1 ti) < (log
∑r
i=1 ti)
r =
(log TF )r, by Theorem 3.6, the complexity is O˜(N2.5P (F)TP (F)κ
2 log 1/ǫ) = O˜((n log p+
∑r
i=1 log ti +
r log log p)2.5TF log2 pκ2 log 1/ǫ) = O˜((n log p + r log(TF/r))2.5TF log2 pκ2 log 1/ǫ) = O˜((n log p +
r)2.5TF log2 pκ2 log 1/ǫ). In the last step, we here use the reduction (a + b log c)(c + d) ≤ (a +
b) log(c+ d)(c + d) = O˜((a+ b)(c + d)).
Corollary 3.11. If p = 2, then the complexity to find a solution of F = 0 mod 2 is O˜((n+r)2.5(n+
TF )κ2 log 1/ǫ).
Proof. If p = 2, then we do not need to convert G to MQ and TP (F) = O(TF +
∑r
i=1 log ti) =
O˜(TF ), NP (F) = O(n +
∑r
i=1 log ti). Similar to the proof of Corollary 3.10, the complexity is
O˜((n +
∑r
i=1 log ti)
2.5(n+ TF )κ2 log 1/ǫ) = O˜((n+ r)2.5(n+ TF )κ2 log 1/ǫ).
3.3 Polynomial equation solving over Fq
In this section, we consider polynomial equation solving in a general finite field Fq by reducing the
problem to equation solving over Fp.
If q = pm with p a prime number and m ∈ Z>1, then Fq = Fp(θ), where ϕ(θ) = 0 for a
monic irreducible polynomial ϕ with deg(ϕ) = m. Let g ∈ Fq[X] = Fp[θ,X]. By setting xi =∑m−1
j=0 xijθ
j and write each coefficient c =
∑m−1
j=0 cjθ
j in g, g can be written as g =
∑m−1
j=0 gjθ
j,
where gj ∈ Fp[Xθ] and Xθ = {xij | i = 1, . . . , n, j = 0, . . . ,m− 1} are variables over Fp. We denote
G(g) = {g0, g1, . . . , gm−1} ⊂ Fp[Xθ]. For a polynomial set F ⊂ Fq[X], we denote
G(F) =
⋃
f∈F
G(f) ⊂ Fp[Xθ]. (10)
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Lemma 3.12. There is an isomorphism Πq : VFp(G(F))→ VFq(F), where Πq(xij) = (
∑m−1
j=0 x1jθ
j,
. . . ,
∑m−1
j=0 xnjθ
j). Furthermore, for an MQ F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ Fq[X] with total sparseness TF ,
G(F) ⊂ Fp[Xθ] is an MQ with total sparseness ≤ m3TF , #G(F) = mr, and #Xθ = mn.
Proof. It is easy to show that #G(F) = m#F , #Xθ = m#X and G(F) is also an MQ. Then the
total sparseness of G(F) will be concerned. F has TF terms, where each term is of degree ≤ 2. For
x =
∑m−1
i=0 xiθ
i and y =
∑m−1
i=0 yiθ
i, let cθk =
∑m−1
j=0 cjkθ
j mod ϕ(θ) for any k ∈ N, then we have
cxy =
∑m−1
i=0
∑m−1
j=0 xiyj
∑m−1
k=0 ck (i+j)θ
k =
∑m−1
i=0 giθ
i, where gi ∈ Fp[x0, . . . , xm−1, y0, . . . , ym−1] is
a quadratic polynomial with TG(cxy) ≤
∑m−1
i=0
∑m−1
j=0
∑m−1
k=0 1 = m
3. Thus an MQ F over Fq can be
represented as another MQ G(F) over Fp with TG(F) ≤ m3TF .
We have
Theorem 3.13. There is a quantum algorithm to find a solution of F ⊂ Fq[X] with probability at
least 1 − ǫ and in time O˜(m5.5T 3.5F D3.5 log4.5 pκ2 log 1/ǫ), where TF is the total sparseness of F ,
D = n+
∑n
i=1⌊log2maxj degxifj⌋, and κ is the condition number of P (G(Q(F))).
Proof. Using Lemma 3.12, we can solve F over Fq similar to the method given in the proof of
Theorem 3.7. In stead of solving F1 = P (Q(F)) ⊂ C[Xbit,Vθbit,Uθbit] with algorithm QBoolSol,
we now solve F1 = P (G(Q(F))) ⊂ C[Xθbit,Vθbit,Uθbit] with algorithm QBoolSol, where Q(F) is
defined in (10) and Xθbit is the bit representation for Xθ.
We now prove the complexity. By Lemma 2.3, Q(F) has O(TFD) indeterminates and to-
tal sparseness O(TFD). G(Q(F)) has O(mTFD) indeterminates and total sparseness O(m3TFD).
SinceG(Q(F)) is an MQ, by Corollary 3.10, the complexity is O˜(((mTFD log p+m(r+TFD))2.5(m3TFD)
log2 pκ2 log 1/ǫ) = O˜(m5.5T 3.5F D
3.5 log4.5 pκ2 log 1/ǫ).
Corollary 3.14. If F is an MQ, the complexity is O˜(m5.5(n log p+ r)2.5(n+ TF ) log2 pκ2 log 1/ǫ).
Corollary 3.15. If q = 2m, then the complexity is O˜(m5.5T 3.5F D
3.5κ2 log 1/ǫ). Moreover, if F ⊂
F2m [X] is an MQ, then the complexity is O˜((n+ r)
2.5(n+ TF )κ2 log 1/ǫ).
4 Reduce inequalities to MQ in Boolean variables
In this section, we show how to reduce the inequality constraints I = {0 ≤ gi(X,Y) ≤ bi, i =
1, . . . , s; 0 ≤ yk ≤ uk, k = 1, . . . ,m;X ∈ Fnp ;Y ∈ Zm} of problem (1) into a B-POSSO, where
g1, . . . , gs ∈ Z[X], b1, . . . , bs, u1, . . . , um ∈ N. We emphasize that for g ∈ C[X,Y], Xˇ ∈ Fnp , and
Yˇ ∈ Zm, g(Xˇ, Yˇ) is evaluated in C.
4.1 Reduce polynomial system over C to MQ in Boolean variables over C
Let G = {g1, . . . , gs} ⊂ Z[X,Y]. We will reduce G into an equivalent MQ in Boolean variables over
C under the condition xi ∈ Fp = {0, 1, . . . , p− 1} and 0 ≤ yj ≤ uj . Let dg = maxsl=1 deg(gl).
Following Lemma 2.3, let Q(G) ⊂ Z[X,Y,V] be the MQ defined in (3), where V is the set of new
indeterminates introduced in Lemma 2.3. We will reduce X, Y, and V = {v1, . . . , vl} to Boolean
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variables. For X, we use (5) to rewrite them as Boolean variables Xbit. For Y, using Lemma 2.1,
the integers yi satisfying 0 ≤ yi ≤ ui can be represented exactly as follows
yi = θui(Yi) =
⌊log2 ui⌋−1∑
j=0
Yi,j2
j + (ui − 2⌊log2 ui)⌋ + 1)Yi,⌊log2 ui⌋,
Yi = {Yi,j | j = 0, . . . , ⌊log2 ui⌋}, (11)
Ybit = ∪mi=1Yi
where Yi,j are Boolean variables.
From Lemma 2.3, each vi ∈ Vk represents a monomial in X and Y of degree ≤ dg. So, 0 ≤ vi ≤
hdg for h = max{p− 1, u1, . . . , um}. By Lemma 2.1, we can write vi as
vi = θhdg (Vi,bit) =
⌊dg log2 h⌋−1∑
j=0
Vi,j2
j + (hdg − 2⌊dg log2 h⌋ + 1)Vi,⌊dg log2 h⌋, (12)
where Vi,bit = {Vi,j | j = 0, . . . , ⌊dg log2 ui⌋}, Vbit = ∪ti=1Vi,bit, and each Vi,j is a Boolean variable.
Let gˆk = Q̂(gk) ∈ Z[X,Y,V] be defined in (4), Q(G) = Q(G) \ {gˆ1, . . . , gˆs}. Substituting xi in
(5), and yi in (11), and vi in (12) into Q(G), gˆk, and Q˜(G), we obtain
B(G), gk, B(G) in Z[Xbit,Ybit,Vbit]. (13)
The following result shows that G and B(G) are equivalent.
Lemma 4.1. For Xˇ ∈ Fnp and Yˇ ∈ Zn such that 0 ≤ yˇj ≤ uj for each j, there exists a Vˇbit such
that gk(Xˇ, Yˇ) = gk(Xˇbit, Yˇbit, Vˇbit) for k = 1, . . . , s and B(G)(Xˇbit, Yˇbit, Vˇbit) = 0.
Proof. From (3), it is easy to see that starting from Xˇ ∈ Fnp and Yˇ ∈ Zm, one may obtain a
unique Vˇ such that B˜(gk)(Xˇ, Yˇ, Vˇ) = 0 and gk(Xˇ, Yˇ) = gˆk(Xˇ, Yˇ, Vˇ) for each k. It suffices to show
that Xˇ, Yˇ, Vˇ can be written as their Boolean forms, which is valid for Xˇ, Yˇ due to (5) and (11)
and Lemma 2.1. From Lemma 2.3, each vi ∈ V is a monomial in X and Y of degree ≤ dg.
So, 0 ≤ vi ≤ hdg for h = max{p− 1, u1, . . . , um}. By Lemma 2.1, there exists a Vˇbit such that
gk(Xˇ, Yˇ) = gˆk(Xˇ, Yˇ, Vˇ) = gk(Xˇbit, Yˇbit, Vˇbit) and B(g)(Xˇbit, Yˇbit, Vˇbit) = 0.
Lemma 4.2. B(G) = {gk} ∪ B(G) defined in (13) has O((m + n)TGdg log dg log h) number of
variables and total sparseness O((m + n)TGd2g log dg log
2 h), and C(B(G)) is O(C(G) + dg log h),
where h = max{p− 1, u1, . . . , um} and dg = maxsl=1 deg(gl)..
Proof. By Lemma 2.3, NQ(G) = O((m+ n)TG log dg), TQ(G) = O((m+ n)TG log dg), and C(Q(G)) =
C(G). Note that |X| = n, |Y| = m, and |V| is bounded by NQ(G) = O((m + n)TG log dg). By
(5), |Xbit| = O(n log p) = O(n log h). By (11), |Ybit| = O(m log h). By (12) and Lemma 2.1,
|Vbit| = O((m + n)TG log dg log hdg )) = O((m + n)dgTG log dg log h)). By (14) and Lemma 2.1,
we have #Gbit = O(s log b). Since s ≤ TG , p − 1, b ≤ h, the number of Boolean variables are
NB(G) = O((m+ n)dgTG log dg log h).
Note that monomials of Q(G) are of the form xixj , xiyj, xivj, yiyj , yivj, or vivj when we rewrite
them as Boolean variables, the sparseness of the new expressions are bounded by log2 p, log p log h,
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dg log p log h, log
2 h, dg log
2 h and d2g log
2 h, respectively. The total sparseness of B(G) is O((m +
n)TGd2g log dg log
2 h).
From (12) and the fact that B(G) is MQ, the bit size of the coefficients of B(G) is O(C(G) +
dg log h).
Remark 4.3. For inequalities involving variables over finite fields, the solution of the inequalities
depends on the representation of Fp. For the general optimization problem 1, we just use standard
representation for Fp. For specific problems, such as the SIS problem in Section 7, we use different
representations for Fp to find the “correct” solution.
4.2 Reduce inequalities into MQ in Boolean variables
We now consider the inequality constraints of problem (1): I = {0 ≤ gi(X,Y) ≤ bi, i = 1, . . . , s; 0 ≤
yk ≤ uk, k = 1, . . . ,m;X ∈ Fnp}, where g1, . . . , gs ∈ Z[X,Y], b1, . . . , bs, u1, . . . , um ∈ N. We will
reduce I into an MQ in Boolean variables. Let
Gi = {Gi,k | k = 0, . . . , ⌊log2 bi⌋},Gbit = ∪si=1Gi,
δ(gi) = θbi(Gi)− gi =
⌊log2 bi⌋−1∑
k=0
Gi,k2
k + (bi − 2⌊log2 bi⌋ + 1)Gi,⌊log2 bi⌋ − gi (14)
I(I) = {δ(g1), . . . , δ(gs)} ∪B(G) ⊂ Z[Xbit,Ybit,Vbit,Gbit]
where Gi,k are Boolean variables, gi and B(G) are defined in (13). We summarize the result of this
section as the following result.
Lemma 4.4. Xˇ ∈ Fnp and Yˇ ∈ Zm satisfy the constraint I if and only if there exist Boolean values
Vˇbit, Gˇbit such that (Xˇbit, Yˇbit, Vˇbit, Gˇbit) is a solution of I(I).
Proof. By Lemma 2.1, 0 ≤ gi(Xbit,Ybit,Vbit) ≤ bi if and only if ∃Gbit such that δ(gi)(Xbit,Ybit,Vbit,
Gbit) = 0. Then, the lemma is a consequence of Lemma 4.1.
We now estimate the parameters of I(I). Let b = maxsi=1 bi, dg = maxsi=1 deg(gi), h = max{p−
1, b, u1, . . . , um}, G = {g1, . . . , gs} and TG ≥ s the total sparseness of G. Then, we have
Lemma 4.5. I(I) has O((m + n)TGdg log dg log h) variables and total sparseness O((m + n)TGd2g
log dg log
2 h). C(I(I)) is O(C(G) + dg log h) .
Proof. Since B(G) = {gk}∪B(G), from (14), NI(G) = NB(G)+#Gbit, TI(G) = TB(G)+
∑
i#θbi(Gi) =
TB(G) + #Gbit, and C(I(G)) = C(B(G)). Note that #Gbit = O(s log b). Since TG ≥ s, #Gbit is
negligible comparing to the complexity of B(G) and the lemma follows directly from Lemma 4.2.
From Lemma 4.5, the total sparseness and the coefficients of I(G) are well controlled.
Corollary 4.6. If gi are linear, then I(G) ⊂ Z[Xbit,Ybit,Gbit], TB(G) = O(TG log h), and NB(G) =
(n+m) log h. Furthermore, TI(I) = O(TG log h+ s log b) and NI(I) = O((n+m) log h+ s log b).
Proof. Since each gi is linear, we have Q(fi) = fi. Then the variable Vk,i,j are not needed and B(G)
has (n + m) log h indeterminates. Also, TB(G) = O(TG log h). The results for I(G) can be proved
similarly.
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4.3 Bounded integer solutions of polynomial inequalities and equations
As a direct application of the reduction method given in this section, we can give a quantum
algorithm to find a feasible solution to the inequality constraint I = {0 ≤ gi(X,Y) ≤ bi, i =
1, . . . , s; 0 ≤ yk ≤ uk, k = 1, . . . ,m;X ∈ Fnp}, where g1, . . . , gs ∈ Z[X,Y], b1, . . . , bs, u1, . . . , um ∈ N.
Use the notations in Lemma 4.5, we have
Proposition 4.7. For ǫ ∈ (0, 1), there is a quantum algorithm to compute a feasible solution to I
with probability > 1− ǫ and in time O˜((m+n)3.5T 3.5G d4.5g log4.5 hκ2 log 1/ǫ), where κ is the condition
number of I(I) defined in (14).
Proof. By Lemma 4.4, to find a feasible solution to I, we need only to find a Boolean solution of I(I).
By Lemma 4.5, NI(I) = O((m + n)TGdg log dg log h), TI(I) = O((m + n)TGd2g log dg log
2 h). Since
NI(I) < TI(I), by Theorem 3.6, the complexity to find a Boolean solution of I(I) is O˜(N2.5I(I)TI(I)κ2
log 1/ǫ) = O˜((m+ n)3.5T 3.5I d
4.5
g log
4.5 hκ2 log 1/ǫ).
A closely related problem is to find bounded integer solutions of a polynomial system over Z.
Proposition 4.8. Let G = {g1, . . . , gs} ⊂ Z[Y] and ǫ ∈ (0, 1). There is a quantum algorithm
to compute an integer solution b = (b1, . . . , bm) of G = 0 satisfying 0 ≤ bi ≤ ui for each i with
probability > 1 − ǫ and in time O˜(m3.5T 3.5G d4.5g log4.5 hκ2 log 1/ǫ), where κ is the condition number
of B˜(G) to be defined in the proof and h = maxi ui.
Proof. By Lemma 4.1, to find an integer solution to G = 0, we need just to find a Boolean solution
of B(G) defined in (13). By Lemma 4.2, we have NB(G) = O(mTGdg log dg log h) and TB(G) =
O(mTGd2g log dg log
2 h). Since NB(G) < TB(G), by Theorem 3.6, the complexity to find a Boolean
solution of B(G) is O˜(N2.5B(G)TB(G)κ2 log 1/ǫ) = O˜(m3.5T 3.5G d4.5g log4.5 hκ2 log 1/ǫ).
For a general polynomial system in C[X], the bound for coordinates of solutions could be double-
exponential, as shown by the following example.
Example 4.9. For F = {x1 − 2, x2 − x21, x3 − x22, . . . , xn − x2n−1} ⊂ C[X], VC(F) = {(2, 22, 24, . . . ,
22
n−1
)}.
On the other hand, the isolated solutions of a polynomial system is at most double-exponential
[29, p. 341]. In a similar way, it is also possible to find bounded rational solutions of a polynomial
system.
5 Optimization over finite fields
5.1 A quantum algorithm for the optimization problem
In this section, we give a quantum algorithm to solve the optimization problem (1). The idea is
to search the minimal value of the objective function by solving several B-POSSOs, which will be
done in four steps.
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Step 1. By Lemmas 2.3 and 3.2, we reduce the equational constraints fj(X) = 0 mod p, j =
1, . . . , r to an MQ in Boolean variables over C: F1 = P (Q(F)) ⊂ C[Xbit,V1bit,Ubit].
Step 2. By Lemma 4.4, we reduce the inequality constraints I = {0 ≤ gi(X,Y) ≤ bi, i =
1, . . . , s} to an MQ in Boolean variables over C: G1 = I(I) ⊂ C[Xbit,Ybit,V2bit,Gbit].
Step 3. Applying Lemma 4.1 to the objective function o(X,Y), we may reduce o into a quadratic
polynomial in Boolean variables o ∈ C[Xbit,Ybit,V3bit] and an MQ G2 = B({o}) ⊂ Z[Xbit,Ybit,V3bit]
defined in (13). For the simplicity of presentation, we denote Vbit = V1bit ∪ V2bit ∪V3bit. Let
C = F1 ∪ G1 ∪ G2 ⊂ C[Xbit,Ybit,Vbit,Ubit,Gbit]. (15)
A (0, 1)-programming is an optimization problem where all the arguments take values of 0 or 1.
By Lemmas 2.3, 3.2, 4.1, and 4.4, we have
Lemma 5.1. Problem (1) is equivalent to the following nonlinear (0, 1)-programming problem
min
Wbit
o(Wbit) subject to C(Wbit) = 0 (16)
where Wbit = (Xbit,Ybit,Vbit,Ubit,Gbit) and C is defined in (15).
Step 4. The basic idea to search a minimal value of the objective function is as follows. Since all
the variables are bounded, the objective function is also bounded, so we may assume α ≤ o(Zˇbit) < µ
for some α, µ ∈ N. We divide [α, µ) into two roughly equal parts: [α,α + 2β) and [α + 2β, µ) and
solve the following decision problem
∃Wbit(o(Wbit) ∈ [α,α + 2β) and (C(Wbit) = 0)). (17)
Let
δαβ(o) = α+
β−1∑
j=0
Fj2
j − o(Wbit) ∈ Z[Zbit], (18)
Lαβ = C ∪ {δαβ(o)} ⊂ Z[Zbit], (19)
where Zbit = Wbit ∪ Fbit = {Xbit,Ybit,Vbit,Ubit,Gbit,Fbit} and Fbit = {F0, . . . , Fβ−1} are Boolean
variables. By Lemma 2.1, we have
Lemma 5.2. Problem (17) has a solution Wˇbit if and only if Lαβ = 0 has a solution Zˇbit =
(Wˇbit, Fˇbit).
If the answer to problem (17) is yes, we repeat the procedure for the new feasible interval
[α, o(Zˇbit)). If the answer is no, we repeat the procedure for the new feasible interval [α + 2
β , µ).
The procedure ends when µ = α+ 1.
We now give the algorithm to solve problem (1). For convenience of later usage, we add a new
constraint 0 ≤ o < u for a given u ∈ N> 0.
Algorithm 5.3 (QFpOpt).
Input: Problem (1), ǫ ∈ (0, 1), and a u ∈ Z>0 such that 0 ≤ o < u.
Output: ô, Xˇ ∈ Fnp , and Yˇ ∈ Zm such that ô = o(Xˇ, Yˇ) is the minimal value of o, or “fail”.
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Step 1: Set α = 0, µ = u.
Step 2: Compute C in (15).
Step 3: Let β = ⌊log2(µ − α)⌋ − 1 and compute Lαβ ⊂ C[Zbit] defined in (19).
Step 4: Let Zˇbit = QBoolSol(Lαβ , ǫ/ log4/3 u), where QBoolSol is from Theorem 3.6.
Step 5: If Algorithm QBoolSol returns a solution: Zˇbit = {Xˇbit, Yˇbit, Vˇbit, Uˇbit, Gˇbit, Fˇbit}, then
Step 5.1: Compute Xˇ and Yˇ from Xˇbit and Yˇbit according to (5) and (11), respectively.
Step 5.2: If Fˇbit = 0, return α, Xˇ and Yˇ.
Step 5.3: If Fˇbit 6= 0, let µ = o(Zˇbit) and goto Step 3.
Step 6: If Zˇbit = ∅, then
Step 6.1: If µ− α > 1, let α = α+ 2β, and goto Step 3.
Step 6.2: If µ− α = 1 and µ 6= u, return µ, Xˇ and Yˇ.
Step 6.3: If µ− α = 1 and µ = u, return “fail”.
Let b = maxsi=1 bi, df = maxi,j{2,deg(fi, xj)}, dg = maxi,j{2,deg(gi, xj)}, h = max{p −
1, u1, . . . , um}, and Go = {o, g1, . . . , gs}. Then, we have
Theorem 5.4. Algorithm 5.3 gives a solution to problem (1) with constraint 0 ≤ o < u with success
probability ≥ 1− ǫ and in complexity O˜(N2.5LαβTLαβκ2 log(1/ǫ) log u), where
NLαβ = O˜(nTF log df log p+ (m+ n)TGodg log h+ log u),
TLαβ = O˜(nTF log df log
2 p+ (m+ n)TGod
2
g log
2 h+ log u),
and κ is the maximal condition number of all Lαβ in the algorithm, called the condition number of
the problem.
Proof. We first prove the termination of the algorithm by showing that the feasible interval [α, µ)
will decrease strictly after each loop starting from Step 3. In Step 3, we split [α, µ) = [α,α+ 2β) ∪
[α + 2β, µ) with (µ − α)/4 < 2β ≤ (µ − α)/2. In Step 5.3, we start a new loop for [α, µ1), where
µ1 = o(Zˇbit) < 2
β . Then after this step, the feasible interval will decrease by at least 12(µ − α) due
to 2β ≤ (µ − α)/2. In Step 6.1, we start a new loop for [α + 2β , µ). After this step, the feasible
interval will decrease by more than 14(µ − α) due to (µ − α)/4 < 2β. In summary, after each loop,
the algorithm either terminates or has a smaller feasible interval which is of at most 3/4 of the size
of the feasible interval of the previous loop. So, the algorithm will terminate after at most log4/3 u
loops.
We now prove the correctness of the algorithm, which follows from the following claim:
The minimal value of o is in [α, µ] during the algorithm (20)
if the minimal value exists and Algorithm QBoolSol in Step 4 always returns a solution of Lαβ if
such a solution exists. The above claim is obviously true for the initial values given in Step 1.
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In Step 5, by Lemma 5.2, we find a solution Zˇbit such that o(Zˇbit) ∈ [α,α + 2β). In Step 5.2,
the condition Fˇbit = 0 means that o(Zˇbit) = α and the minimal solution o is found by claim (20).
In Step 5.3, the condition Fˇbit 6= 0 means that o(Zˇbit) 6= α and we have a new µ1 = o(Zˇbit). Since
o ∈ [α, µ1] has a solution Zˇbit, by claim (20), the minimal value of o is in [α, µ1], and the claim is
proved in this case.
In Step 6, QBoolSol returns ∅, meaning that o(Zˇbit) ∈ [α,α + 2β) has no solution and the
minimal value of o must be in [α + 2β , µ) if it exists. So, in Step 6.1, we will find the minimal
value of o in [α + 2β, µ) in the next loop, and claim (20) is proved in this case. In Step 6.2, we
have µ − α = 1 and µ 6= u. Since o ∈ [α,α + 2β) has no solution, by claim (20), µ = α + 1 must
be the minimal value of o. Note that in Step 6, we only update the lower bound α. In Step 5, we
only update the upper bound µ, and when µ is updated we have µ = o(Zˇbit) = o(Xˇ, Yˇ). Therefore,
µ = o(Xˇ, Yˇ) is always valid, once Step 5 is executed. The condition µ 6= b implies that Step 5 has
been executed at least one time and hence µ = o(Xˇ, Yˇ). In Step 6.3, the conditions µ− α = 1 and
µ = u means that Step 5 is never executed and the problem has no solution.
Finally, the solution obtained by Algorithm 5.3 is correct if and only if each Step 4 is correct,
that is, if Lαβ does have solutions, then QBoolSol will return a solution. Since Step 4 will execute
at most log4/3 u times, by Theorem 3.6, the probability for the algorithm to be correct is at least
(1− ǫ/ log4/3 u)log4/3 u > 1− ǫ.
We now analyse the complexity. Note that 2 is added to df to make sure log df 6= 0. By Lemma
3.8, F1 is of total sparseness O(nTF log df log2 p) and has O(nTF log df log p) indeterminates.
By Lemma 4.5, G1 = I(I) is of total sparseness O((m + n)TGd2g log dg log2 h) and has O((m +
n)dgTG log dg log h) indeterminates. Also, G2 = B(o) is of total sparsenessO((m+n)Tod2g log dg log2 h)
and has O((m+ n)dgTo log dg log h) indeterminates.
δαβ(o) is of total sparseness O(log u + To) = O(log u + Tod
2
g log
2 h) and has O(log u + (m +
n)dgTo log dg log h) indeterminates, since 2
β − α < u.
Then, Lαβ = C∪{δαβ(o)} = F1∪G1∪G2∪{δαβ(o)} is of total sparseness TLαβ = TF1+TG1+TG2+
Tδαβ(o) = O˜(nTF log df log
2 p + (m + n)TGod2g log
2 h + log u) and has NLαβ = O˜(nTF log df log p +
(m+ n)dgTGo log h+ log u) indeterminates.
In Step 4, by Theorem 3.6, since NLαβ < TLαβ , we can find a Boolean solution of Lαβ in time
O˜(N2.5Lαβ (NLαβ + TLαβ )κ
2 log(ǫ/ log u)) = O˜(N2.5LαβTLαβκ
2 log(ǫ/ log u)). It is clear that in each loop,
the complexity of the algorithm is dominated by Step 4. Since we have at most log4/3 u loops, the
complexity for Algorithm 5.3 is O˜(N2.5LαβTLαβκ
2 log((log4/3 u)/ǫ) log4/3 u) = O˜(N
2.5
Lαβ
TLαβκ
2 log(1/ǫ)
log u).
We now show how to solve the original problem (1).
Corollary 5.5. Algorithm 5.3 gives a solution to problem (1) with the same probability and complex-
ity for u = 2#(o)hoh
do+1, where ho is the height of the coefficients of o, h = max{p−1, u1, . . . , um},
and do = deg(o).
Proof. It is easy to see that |o| ≤ #(o)hohdo , so 0 ≤ o˜ < u for the new objective function o˜ =
o+#(o)hoh
do . Then Theorem 5.4 can be used to the new optimization problem.
Remark 5.6. Note that the upper bound u = 2#(o)hoh
do+1 for the objective function is quite large.
An alternative way is to use Algorithm QBoolSol in Theorem 3.6 to find a solution Xˇbit, Yˇbit for
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F1 ∪ G1 ⊂ C[Xbit,Ybit,V1bit,V2bit,Ubit,Gbit] and set u = 2o(Xˇ, Yˇ) + 1. Then for the new objective
function o˜ = o + o(Xˇ, Yˇ), we can use the constraint 0 ≤ o˜ < u to find a solution to problem (1).
This does not change the complexity of the algorithm.
5.2 Applications to linear (0, 1)-programming and QUBO
In this section, we use two (0, 1)-programming problems to illustrate Algorithm 5.3. QUBO means
quadratic unconstrained binary optimization, which is the mathematical problem that can be solved
by the D-Wave
The linear (0, 1)-programming is one of Karp’s 21 NP-complete problems [22] which covers lots
of fundamental computational problems, such as the subset sum problem, the assignment problem,
the traveling salesperson problem, the knapsack problem, etc. For more information about this
problem, please refer to [16]. The linear (0, 1)-programming can be stated as follows [8]
min
Ybit∈{0,1}m
o(Ybit) =
m∑
j=1
cjyj subject to
m∑
j=1
aijyj ≤ hi, i = 1, . . . , s (21)
where Ybit = (y1, . . . , ym) and aij, cj , hi ∈ Z for any i, j. We reduce problem (21) to the standard
form (1). Let ei =
∑m
j=1 |aij | ∈ Z≥0, 1 ≤ i ≤ s and gi =
∑m
j=1 aijyj + ei and bi = hi+ ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ s.
Let u = 2
∑m
i=1 |cj |+ 1 ∈ N. Then, problem (21) is equivalent to
min
Ybit∈{0,1}m2
oB(Ybit) =
m∑
j=1
cjyj + (u− 1)/2 subject to (22)
0 ≤ oB(Ybit) < u; 0 ≤ gi ≤ bi, i = 1, . . . , s.
So we can use Algorithm 5.3 to solve problem (22). Let G = {g1, . . . , gs}. Since gi are linear,
we do not need to compute Q(gi) and Vbit = ∅ (see (12) for definition) and B(G) = ∅ (see (13) for
definition). Since yj are Boolean variables, we do not need to use (11) to expand them and hence
gi = gi. So, (14) becomes
δ(gi) = θbi(Gi) =
⌊log2 bi⌋−1∑
k=0
Gi,k2
k + (bi − 2⌊log2 bi⌋ + 1)Gi,⌊log2 bi⌋ − gi
I(I) = {δ(g1), . . . , δ(gs)} ⊂ Z[Ybit,Gbit],
where Gbit = {Gikl} are Boolean variables and θbi(Gi) is defined in (2). Equation (18) becomes
δαβ(o) = α+
β−1∑
j=0
Fj2
j − oB ∈ Z[Ybit,Fbit], (23)
Lαβ = I(I) ∪ {δαβ(o)} ⊂ Z[Ybit,Gbit,Fbit],
where Fbit = {F1, . . . , Fβ−1} are Boolean variables.
Proposition 5.7. We can use Algorithm 5.3 to solve problem (22) with probability ≥ 1− ǫ and in
time O˜(s(m2.5 + s2.5 log2.5 h)(m + log h)κ2 log(1/ǫ) log u) where u = 2
∑m
i=1 |cj |+ 1, b = maxsi=1 bi,
h = max{u, b}, and κ is the maximal condition number of Lαβ.
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Proof. Since #Ybit = m, #Gbit = s log b, and #Fbit = log u, Lαβ has m + s log b + log u Boolean
variables and total sparseness s(m + log b) + m + 1 + log u. Since u, b ≤ h, Lαβ has NLαβ =
O(m + s log h) Boolean variables and total sparseness TLαβ = O(s(m + log h)). By Theorem 3.6,
the complexity is O˜((m + s log h)2.5(s(m + log h))κ2 log(1/ǫ) log u = O˜(s(m2.5 + s2.5 log2.5 h)(m +
log h)κ2 log(1/ǫ) log u).
In the rest of this section, we consider the QUBO problem. The QUBO problem is to find an
Ybit = (y1, . . . , ym)
T ∈ {0, 1}m that minimizes YTbitQYbit for an upper-triangular matrix Q = (Qi,j)
with Qi,j ∈ Z, which can be written as the following (0, 1)-programming problem:
min
Y∈{0,1}m
oQ(Ybit) = Y
T
bitQYbit (24)
In order to solve this problem, we need to give the lower and upper bounds for the objective function.
Let Qmax = max
i,j
|Qi,j |. Since yi ∈ {0, 1}, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have |o(Y)| ≤ m2Qmax.
Problem (24) can be converted into the standard form with the new objective function o˜Q =
oQ +m
2Qmax and u = 2m
2Qmax + 1. Then, we can use Algorithm 5.3 to solve problem (24). Let
δαβ(o) = α+
β−1∑
j=0
Fj2
j − o˜Q ∈ C[Ybit,Fbit],
where Fbit = (F0, . . . , Fβ−1) ∈ Fβ2 and Lαβ = {δαβ(o)}. We have
Proposition 5.8. We can use Algorithm 5.3 to solve problem (24) with probability ≥ 1− ǫ and in
time O˜(m2.5 + log2.5Qmax)(m
2 + logQmax) logQmaxκ
2 log(1/ǫ)) where κ is the maximal condition
number of Lαβ and Qmax = max
i,j
|Qi,j|.
Proof. Since oQ is quadratic and the variables are Boolean, we can solve Lαβ = {δαβ(o)} directly
with Theorem 3.6. Using the notations in Theorem 5.4, we have NLαβ = m + log(m
2Qmax) =
O˜(m + logQmax), TLαβ = O˜(m
2 + logQmax), u = 2m
2Qmax + 1. By Theorem 5.4, the complexity
is O˜((m+ logQmax)
2.5(m2+ logQmax)κ
2 log(1/ǫ)(logm+ logQmax)) = O˜(m
2.5+ log2.5Qmax)(m
2+
logQmax) logQmaxκ
2 log(1/ǫ)).
6 Polynomial system with noise
In this section, we consider the polynomial systems with noise problem (PSWN), which is an opti-
mization problem over finite fields and has important applications in cryptography [2, 20].
6.1 Polynomial system with noise
Definition 6.1. Let p be a prime. Given a polynomial system F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ Fp[X], the
PSWN is to find an X = (x1, . . . , xn)
τ ∈ Fnp such that F = e for the “smallest” error-vector
e = (e1, . . . , er)
τ ∈ Frp.
19
In most cases, the Hamming weight ‖e‖H of e is used to measure the “smallness” and it is
assumed that r ≫ n, that is, we minimize the number of non-zero components of e or satisfy the
maximal number of equations of F = 0. Therefore, PSWN is also called MAX-POSSO. We first
give the following representation for ‖e‖H .
Lemma 6.2. Let e = (e1, . . . , er)
τ ∈ Fnp and Hj = ep−1j in Fp. Then Hj is Boolean and ‖e‖H =∑m
j=1Hj when the summation is over C.
Proof. ej ∈ Fp implies Hj = ep−1j is either 0 or 1 in Fp, and Hj = 1 if and only if ej 6= 0. Then, Hj
is a Boolean variable. Thus, we have
∑m
j=1Hj = ‖e‖H when the summation is over C.
Let
E(F) = (F − e) ∪ {Hj − ep−1j | j = 1, . . . , r} ⊂ Fp[X,E,Hbit] (25)
where Hbit = {H1, . . . ,Hr} are Boolean variables and E = {e1, . . . , er} are variables over Fp. By
Lemma 6.2, PSWN can be formulated as the following optimization problem over finite fields:
min
X∈Fnp
o(X) =
r∑
j=1
Hj subject to 0 ≤ o(X) ≤ r;E(F) = 0 mod p (26)
which can be solved by Algorithm 5.3.
Due to the special structure of E(F), we can achieve better complexities than that given in
Theorem 5.4. Following (19), the equation set Lαβ for PSWN is
δαβ(o) = α+
β−1∑
j=0
Fj2
j −
r∑
j=1
Hj ∈ C[Hbit,Fbit],
Lαβ(F) = P (Q(E(F))) ∪ {δαβ(o)} ⊂ C[Xbit,Ebit,Hbit,Fbit,Vbit,Ubit], (27)
where Fbit = {F1, . . . , Fβ−1} are Boolean variables. We have
Proposition 6.3. There is a quantum algorithm to solve PSWN in time O˜(n3.5T 3.5F log
8 pκ2 log 1/ǫ)
and with probability ≥ 1− ǫ, where TF is the total sparseness of F , and κ is the extended condition
number of F .
Proof. We first give the complexity of Step 4 of Algorithm 5.3, that is, the complexity to solve
Lαβ(F). Let F1 = {f1 − e1, . . . , fr − er}, F2 = {H1 − ep−11 , . . . ,Hr − ep−1r }, and F3 = F1 ∪
F2. Then P (Q(F3)) = P (Q(F1)) ∪ P (Q(F2)). By Lemma 3.8, TP (Q(F1)) = O(TFD log2 p) and
NP (Q(F1)) = O(TFD log p). Since each monomial in F2 depends on one indeterminate, we have
Q(F2) ⊂ Fp[Hbit, e,V], where #V = O(r log p),#Q(F2) = O(r log p), and TQ(F2) = O(r log p) by
the proof for Lemma 2.3. By Lemma 3.3, TP (Q(F2)) = O(r log
3 p) and NP (Q(F2)) = O(r log
2 p). Since
x ∈ Fp implies xp = x, we can assume degxifj < p. Thus D = n +
∑r
i=1⌊log2maxj degxifj⌋ ≤ n +
n⌊log2(p−1)⌋ = O(n log p), and we have TLαβ = O(TFD log2 p+r log3 p+r+log p) = O(TFn log3 p)
and NLαβ = O(TFD log p + r log
2 p + log r) = O(TFn log2 p). By Theorem 3.6, the complexity
to solve Lαβ is O˜((TFn log2 p)2.5(TFn log2 p + TFn log3 p)κ2 log 1/ǫ) = O˜((n3.5T 3.5F log
8 pκ2 log 1/ǫ).
The number of loops is at most log r, which is negligible since r ≤ TF , and the complexity of the
algorithm is that of Step 4. The theorem is proved.
Similar to Corollary 3.10, if F is an MQ then the complexity is lower.
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Corollary 6.4. There is a quantum algorithm to solve the MQ with noise in time O˜((n+ r log p)2.5
(TF log p+ r log2 p+ n) log3.5 pκ2 log 1/ǫ) with probability 1− ǫ.
6.2 Linear system with noise
When F becomes a linear system, we obtain the linear system with noise (LSWN) [17]. Given a
matrix A = (Aij) ∈ Fr×np and a vector b = (b1, . . . , br)τ ∈ Frp. The LSWN problem is to find an X
such that AX− b = e and the error-vector e ∈ Frp has minimal Hamming weight ‖e‖H .
The algorithm given in Section 6.1 can be used to solve the LSWN and Proposition 6.3 becomes
the following form.
Proposition 6.5. There exists a quantum algorithm to solve LSWN with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ and
in time O˜((n + r log p)2.5(TA + r log
2 p) log3.5 pκ2 log 1/ǫ), where TA ≥ max{r, n} is the number of
nonzero entries in A, and κ is the extended condition number of AX.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 6.3, we need only consider the complexity of solv-
ing Lαβ(AX − b). Let fi =
∑n
j=1Aijxj − bi − ei ∈ Fp[X, e], F1 = {f1, . . . , fr}, F2 = {H1 −
ep−11 , . . . ,Hr − ep−1r } , and we have E(AX − b) = F1 ∪ F2. Since F1 is a linear system, we have
P (Q(E(AX − b))) = P (F1) ∪ P (Q(F2)). By Corollary 3.4, TP (F1) = O(TA log p) and NP (F1) =
n log p+
∑r
i=1 log ti+ r log log p, where ti is the sparseness for the i-th row of matrix A. By Lemma
3.3, TP (Q(F2)) = O(r log
3 p) and NP (Q(F2)) = O(r log
2 p). Thus, TLαβ(AX−b) = O(TA log p+ r log
3 p)
and NLαβ(AX−b) = O(n log p +
∑r
i=1 log ti + r log
2 p). By Theorem 3.6, the complexity to solve
Lαβ(AX− b) is
O˜((n log p+
r∑
i=1
log ti + r log
2 p)2.5((n log p+
r∑
i=1
log ti + r log
2 p) + (TA log p+ r log
3 p))κ2 log 1/ǫ)
= O˜((n log p+ r log2 p)2.5(n log p+ TA log p+ r log
3 p)κ2 log 1/ǫ).
Since TA ≥ r and we can assume TA ≥ n without loss of generality, the complexity is O˜((n log p+
r log2 p)2.5(TA log p+ r log
3 p)κ2 log 1/ǫ) = O˜((n + r log p)2.5(TA + r log
2 p) log3.5 pκ2 log 1/ǫ).
7 Short integer solution problem
In this section, we consider the short integer solution problem (SIS), which is a basic problem in
the latticed based cryptosystems [1].
7.1 Short integer solution problem
Consider the SIS problem introduced in [1]:
Definition 7.1. Let A = (Aij) ∈ Fr×np . The SIS is to find an X ∈ Fnp such that AX = 0 (mod p)
and the Euclidean norm of X satisfies 0 < ‖X‖2 ≤ b, where b is a given integer.
We first consider the more general SIS for F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ Fp[X]: find an X such that
F(X) = 0 (mod p) and 0 < ‖X‖2 ≤ b. Note that SIS is a special case of the optimization problem
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(1), where the objective function is a constant and the problem is to find a feasible solution for the
constraints. Precisely, the SIS can be formualted as the following standard form
min
X∈Fnp
o = 1 subject to F = 0 mod p, 0 ≤ ‖X‖22 − 1 ≤ b2 − 1. (28)
From Remark 4.3, the representation for Fp affects inequality constraints. For the inequality
0 < ‖X‖22 ≤ b2, a better representation for Fp is {−p−12 , . . . , p−12 }, instead of {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}. In
this section, we still use {0, 1, . . . , p− 1} to represent elements in Fp, but use the following variable
expansion instead of (5):
xi = θp−1(Xi)− p− 1
2
=
⌊log2(p−1)−1⌋∑
j=0
Xi,j2
j + (p− 2⌊log2(p−1)⌋)Xi,⌊log2(p−1)⌋ −
p− 1
2
(29)
where Xi are defined in (5). Then, xi takes values −p−12 , . . . , p−12 when evaluated over C. The
following easy result shows that this representation gives the “global” solution to problems involving
the Euclidean norm.
Lemma 7.2. For Xˇ ∈ [−p−12 , p−12 ]n and any vector v ∈ (pZ)n\0, ‖Xˇ‖2 < ‖Xˇ+ v‖2.
Due to (14) and by Lemma 7.2, the constraint 0 ≤ ‖X‖22 − 1 ≤ b2 − 1 can be written as the
following MQ in Boolean variables
δb = θb2−1(Gbit)−
n∑
i=1
(θp−1(Xi)− p− 1
2
)2 + 1 ∈ C[Gbit,Xbit] (30)
where Gbit = {Gk | k = 0, . . . , ⌊log2(b2 − 1)⌋}. From the above discussion, we have
Lemma 7.3. To solve the SIS, we need only to find a solution of P (Q(F))∪{δb} ⊂ C[Xbit,Vbit,Ubit,
Gbit], where P (Q(F)) is obtained similar to P (Q(F)), but using (29) to expand X, V, and U.
Proposition 7.4. There is a quantum algorithm to solve the SIS problem (28) with probability
at least 1 − ǫ and complexity O˜(n3.5T 3.5F log3.5 d log4.5 pκ2 log 1/ǫ) where TF is the total sparseness
of F , d = max{2, log2(degxi(fj)), i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , r}, and κ is the condition number of
P (Q(F)) ∪ {δb}.
Proof. Since ‖X‖22 ≤ np2, by Lemma 2.1, #Gbit = O˜(log(b2−1)) ≤ O˜(log(np2)) = O˜(log(n)+log p)
and #δb = O˜(log(b
2 − 1) + n log2 p) = O˜(log(b) + n log2 p) = O˜(n log2 p), since b ≤ np2. By Lemma
3.8, P (Q(F)) is of sparseness O(nTF log d log2 p) and with O(nTF log d log p) indeterminates. By
Lemma 7.3, we need to solve P (Q(F))∪{δb} with Theorem 3.6. Comparing to the total sparseness
and number of variables of P (Q(F)), #δb and #Gbit are negligible. Then, the complexity of solving
the SIS is the same as that of solving P (Q(F)). Then, the theorem follows from Corollary 3.9.
For the original SIS, we have
Proposition 7.5. There is a quantum algorithm to find an non-trivial X ∈ Zn for AX = 0 (mod p)
with ‖X‖2 ≤ b with probability 1 − ǫ and in time O˜((n log p + r)2.5(TA log p + n log2 p)κ2 log 1/ǫ),
where TA is the number of nonzero elements of A, assuming TA ≥ n.
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Proof. By Corollary 3.4, P (Q(AX)) = P (AX) is of total sparseness O(TA log p) and has O(n log p+∑r
i=1 log ti + r log log p) indeterminates, where ti is the sparseness for the i-th line of matrix A..
From the proof of Proposition 7.4, #Gbit = O˜(log n + log p) and #δb = O˜(n log
2 p). Since TA ≥ n,
we have TLαβ = O(TA log p+ n log
2 p) and NLαβ = O(n log p+
∑r
i=1 log ti + r log log p). Comparing
to the total sparseness and number of variables of P (Q(F)), #δb is negligible. By Theorem 3.6, the
complexity to solve P (Q(F))∪{δb} is O˜((n log p+
∑r
i=1 log ti+r log log p)
2.5((n log p+
∑r
i=1 log ti+
r log log p) + (TA log p+ n log
2 p))κ2 log 1/ǫ) = O˜((n log p+ r)2.5(TA log p+ n log
2 p)κ2 log 1/ǫ).
7.2 Smallest integer solution problem
We consider the smallest integer solution problem, which is to find a solution of F = 0 (mod p),
which has the minimal Euclidean norm. The problem can be formulated as the following standard
form
min
X∈Fnp
o = ‖X‖22 − 1 subject to F = 0 mod p and 0 ≤ o < u (31)
where u = n(p−1)2. We can use Algorithm 5.3 to solve problem (31). The parameterized objective
function and Lαβ(F) are
δαβ(o) = α+
β−1∑
j=0
Fj2
j −
n∑
i=1
(θ(Xi)− p− 1
2
)2 + 1 ∈ C[Fbit,Xbit]. (32)
Lαβ = P (Q(F)) ∪ {δαβ} ⊂ C[Xbit,Vbit,Ubit,Fbit]
where P (Q(F)) is defined in Lemma 7.3. We have
Proposition 7.6. There is a quantum algorithm to solve problem (31) with probability ≥ 1− ǫ and
in time O˜(n3.5T 3.5F log
3.5 d log4.5 pκ2 log 1/ǫ).
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 7.4, NLαβ = O(nTF log d log p) and TLαβ = O(nTF log d log
2 p).
Also, log u = O(np2) = O(log n+ log p). By Theorem 5.4, the complexity is O˜(N2.5LαβTLαβκ
2 log 1/ǫ
log u) = O˜(n3.5T 3.5F log
3.5 d log4.5 pκ2 log 1/ǫ).
If F is a linear system AX = 0 with TA ≥ n, then we can prove the following result similar to
Propositions 7.6 and 7.5.
Proposition 7.7. There is a quantum algorithm to find a non-trivial X ∈ Zn for AX = 0 (mod p)
with minimal ‖X‖2 with probability ≥ 1−ǫ and in time O˜((n log p+r)2.5(TA log p+n log2 p)κ2 log 1/ǫ).
8 Quantum algorithm for SVP and CVP
In this section, Algorithm 5.3 is used to solve the SVP and CVP problems [23, 6].
A lattice generated by B = {b1, . . . ,bn} ⊂ Rm is the set of Z-linear combinations of bi. B is
called a basis of the lattice, if b1, . . . ,bn are linear independent over R. The SVP problem can be
described as follows: given a lattice L generated by a basis b1, . . . ,bn in R
m, find a nonzero v ∈ L
such that v has the minimal Euclidean norm. The CVP problem can be described as follows: given
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a vector b0 ∈ Zm and a lattice L generated by a basis b1, . . . ,bn in Rm, find a v ∈ L such that
v− b0 has the minimal Euclidean norm. In this paper, we assume that b1, . . . ,bn are in Zm. The
SVP problem can be written as the following optimization problem.
min
v∈Zm,a∈Zn,
o = ‖v‖22 subject to v 6= 0 and v =
n∑
i=1
aibi, (33)
where v = (v1, . . . , vm) and a = (a1, . . . , an). Note that the SVP problem is similar to the SIS
problem considered in Proposition 7.7, but the solutions are over the integers instead of finite fields.
Let
B = [b1, . . . ,bn] ∈ Zm×n
be the matrix with columns b1, . . . ,bn. In order to reduce problem (33) into the standard form (1),
we need to find upper bounds for ai, vi, and ‖v‖2. For a matrix or a vector A, let ‖A‖∞ to be the
maximum absolute value of the elements in A. It is easy to find bounds for vi and ‖v‖2.
Lemma 8.1. Let v = (v1, . . . , vm) be the shortest vector in L. Then we have ‖v‖2 ≤
√
m||B||∞
and |vi| ≤
√
m||B||∞.
Proof. It is clear that ‖v‖2 ≤
√
m||B||∞ and |vi| ≤ ‖v‖∞ ≤ ‖v‖2 ≤
√
m||B||∞.
In order to bound ai in (33), we need the concept of Hermite normal form (HNF). A matrix
H = (hi,j) ∈ Zm×n of rank n is called an (column) HNF if there exists a strictly increasing map f
from [1, n] to [1,m] satisfying: for j ∈ [1, n], hf(j),j ≥ 1, hi,j = 0 if i > f(j) and hf(j),j > hf(j),k ≥ 0
if k > j. It is known that any lattice generated by a basis b1, . . . ,bn is also generated by h1, . . . ,hn
if H = [h1, . . . ,hn] is an HNF of B = [b1, . . . ,bn]. We need the following obvious property of HNF.
Lemma 8.2. Let H = [h1, . . . ,hn] = [hij ] be an HNF, v = (v1, . . . , vm)
τ an element in the lattice
generated by h1, . . . ,hn, and v = c1h1 + · · · + cnhn for ci ∈ Z. Then vf(n) = cnhf(n),n and hence
|cn| ≤ ||v||∞.
We also need the following result about HNF.
Theorem 8.3 ([27]). Let B ∈ Zm×n with rank n and H be the HNF of B. Then, there exists an
E ∈ Zm×m such that EB = H, ||H||∞ ≤ (
√
n||B||∞)n and ||E||∞ ≤ (
√
n||B||∞)n. Furthermore,
the bit complexity to compute H from B is O˜(mnθ||B||∞), where θ is the matrix multiplication
constant.
We now give a bound for ai in (33).
Lemma 8.4. Let v be the shortest vector in L. Then there exist a1, . . . , an ∈ Z such that v =∑n
i=1 aibi and |ai| ≤ bB, where bB = n
√
m||B||∞((
√
n||B||∞)n + 1)n+1.
Proof. Let H = EB be the HNF of B and hi the i-th column of H, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then there exist
ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that v =
∑n
i=1 cihi. Denote e1 =
√
m||B||∞ and e2 = (
√
n||B||∞)n+1. We claim
that |ci| ≤ e1(e2 + 1)n. Let vi = c1h1 + · · · + cihi for i = 1, . . . , n. We prove the claim by proving
||vi||∞ ≤ e1(e2 + 1)n−i and |ci| ≤ e1(e2 + 1)n−i by induction for i = n, n− 1, . . . , i. By Lemma 8.2,
the second inequality comes from the first one: |ci| ≤ ||vi||∞ ≤ e1(e2 + 1)n−i, since [h1, . . . ,hi] is
also an HNF. By Lemma 8.2, |cn| ≤ e1 and the case of i = n is true. Suppose the claim is true
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for i = n, . . . , j + 1. By Lemma 8.1, we have ||hj+1||∞ ≤ e2. Since vj = vj+1 − cj+1hj+1, we have
‖vj‖∞ ≤ ||vj+1||∞ + |cj+1|||hj+1||∞ ≤ e1(e2 + 1)n−j−1 + e1(e2 + 1)n−j−1e2 = e1(e2 + 1)n−j . The
claim is proved.
We have v =
∑n
i=1 cihi = (c1, . . . , cn)H = (c1, . . . , cn)EB = a1b1 + · · · + anbn. Then
(a1, . . . , an) = (c1, . . . , cn)E, and hence |ai| ≤ nmaxi |ci| · ||E||∞ ≤ ne1(e2 + 1)ne2 ≤ ne1(e2 + 1)n+1
by Theorem 8.3.
By the above lemma, we can rewrite the SVP as the standard form (1):
min
v∈Zm,a∈Zn
o = ‖v‖22 − 1 subject to 0 ≤ o < m||B||2∞
v = a1b1 + · · ·+ anbn,
0 ≤ ai + bB ≤ 2bB , 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
0 ≤ vi +
√
m||B||∞ ≤ 2
√
m||B||∞, 1 ≤ i ≤ m
where bB is given in Lemma 8.4, and the arguments are v = (v1, . . . , vm) and a = (a1, . . . , an).
Note that, the above problem is already an MQ, so we just need to change the variables to
Boolean variables as follows by using Lemma 2.1.
ai = θ2bB (Ai,0, . . . , Ai,⌊log2(2bB)⌋)− bB, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
vi = θ2
√
m||B||∞(Vi,0, . . . , Vi,⌊log2(2
√
m||B||∞)⌋)−
√
m||B||∞, 1 ≤ i ≤ m (34)
where and Ai,j , Vi,j are Boolean variables.
Then we can use Algorithm 5.3 to solve the problem for u = m||B||2∞ in the input. For the
objective function o, we denote by o the Boolean function obtain from o by replacing the vi by the
above equation (34). Let
δαβ(o) = α+
β−1∑
j=0
Cj2
j − o+ 1, (35)
Lαβ = C ∪ {δαβ(o)},
where C is obtained from v = ∑ni=1 aibi by replacing the ai, vi by the equation (34).
Proposition 8.5. There exists a quantum algorithm to solve the SVP with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ
and in time O˜(m(n7.5 +m2.5)(n3 + log h) log4.5 hκ2 log 1ǫ ), where h = ||B||∞ and κ is the maximal
condition number of Lαβ.
Proof. The numbers of {Ai,j}, {Vi,j}, and {Cj} in (34) and (35) are n log2(2bB), m log2(
√
m||B||∞)
and log2(m||B||2∞), respectively. So, NLαβ = n log2(2bB) + m log2(
√
m||B||∞) + log2(m||B||2∞) =
O˜(n3 log h+m log h). The total sparseness of C is O(m(log(√m‖B‖∞)+n log(2bB))) and the total
sparseness of δαβ(o) is log2(m||B||2∞)+m log2(
√
m||B||∞). So the total sparseness of Lαβ is TLαβ =
m(n log(2bB) + log(
√
m‖B‖∞)) + m log2(
√
m||B||∞) + log2(m||B||2∞) = O˜(mn3 log h + m log2 h).
By Theorem 3.6, the SVP can be solved in time O˜(N2.5LαβTLαβκ
2 log 1ǫ log(m||B||2∞)) = O˜(m(n7.5 +
m2.5)(n3 + log h) log4.5 hκ2 log 1ǫ ).
The CVP can be solved similar to SVP, where the only difference is that the objective function
is o = ‖v − b0‖22 − 1 < m(||B||∞ + ||b0||∞)2. Similar to Proposition 8.5, we have
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Proposition 8.6. There exists a quantum algorithm to solve the CVP with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ
and in time O˜(m(n3 log h+m log h+ log h0)
2.5(n3 log h+ log2(h+ h0))κ
2 log 1ǫ ), where h = ||B||∞,
h0 = ||b0||∞, and κ is the condition number of the problem.
9 Quantum algorithm to recover the private key for NTRU
In this section, we will give a quantum algorithm to recover the private key of NTRU from its known
public key.
The NTRU cryptosystem depends on three integer parameters (N, p, q) and two sets Lf ,Lg of
polynomials in Z[X] with degree N − 1. Note that p and q need not to be prime, but we will
assume that gcd(p, q) = 1, and q is always considerably larger than p. Denote Zk to be the ring
Z/(k) = {0, 1 . . . , k − 1} for any k ∈ Z>0. We work in the ring R = Z[X]/(XN − 1). An element
F ∈ R will be written as a polynomial or a vector,
F =
N−1∑
i=0
Fix
i = (F0, F1, . . . , FN−1)τ . (36)
Given two positive integers df and dg, we set
Lf = {f ∈ R | f has df coefficients 1, df − 1 coefficients − 1, and the rest 0}, (37)
Lg = {g ∈ R | g has dg coefficients 1, dg coefficients − 1, and the rest 0}. (38)
Let f ∈ Lf be invertible both (mod p) and (mod q). The private key for NTRU is f and the public
key is h = gf−1 (mod q) for some g ∈ Lg. A set of parameters could be (N, p, q) = (107, 3, 64),
df = 15, and dg = 12 [19].
We need to find f from h. We will reduce this problem to an equation solving problem over
the finite rings Zp and Zq. Set f = (f0, . . . , fN−1)τ , g = (g0, . . . , gN−1)τ , f−1 (mod p) = p =
(p0, . . . , pN−1)τ , f−1 (mod q) = q = (q0, . . . , qN−1)τ , and h = (h0, . . . , hN−1)τ . Thus, we have the
following equations:
f ∈ Lf ⇐⇒ 2df =
N−1∑
i=0
f2i + 1,
N−1∑
i=0
fi = 1 and each f
3
i − fi = 0; (39)
g ∈ Lg ⇐⇒ 2dg =
N−1∑
i=0
g2i ,
N−1∑
i=0
gi = 0 and each g
3
i − gi = 0; (40)
h = gf−1 (mod q) ⇐⇒
∑
j+k=i,i+N
hjfk ≡ gi (mod q) for i = 0, . . . , N − 1; (41)
f−1 (mod q) exists ⇐⇒
∑
j+k=i,i+N
qjfk ≡ δ0i (mod q) for i = 0, . . . , N − 1; (42)
f−1 (mod p) exists ⇐⇒
∑
j+k=i,i+N
pjfk ≡ δ0i (mod p) for i = 0, . . . , N − 1, (43)
where δ0i = 1 for i = 0 and δ0i = 0 for i 6= 0. Let X = {fi, gi, hi, pi, qi | i = 0, . . . , N − 1}, and
F1 = {2df =
N−1∑
i=0
f2i + 1, 2dg =
N−1∑
i=0
g2i ,
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N−1∑
i=0
fi − 1,
N−1∑
i=0
gi, f
3
i − fi, g3i − gi, i = 0, . . . , N − 1} ⊂ C[f, g], (44)
F2 = {
∑
j+k=i,i+N
hjfk − gi,
∑
j+k=i,i+N
qjfk − δ0i | i = 0, . . . , N − 1} ⊂ Zq[f, g, h,q], (45)
F3 = {
∑
j+k=i,i+N
pjfk − δ0i | i = 0, . . . , N − 1} ⊂ Zp[f, g, h,p]. (46)
Note that F1,F2,F3 are over C, Zq, Zp, respectively. We can modify the method given in Section
3.1 to solve the equation system F1 = F2 = F3 = 0.
We first give a simpler treatment for F1. Let Zbit = {Fi1, Fi2, Gi1, Gi2, i = 0, . . . , N − 1} be
Boolean variables, fi = Fi1 + Fi2 − 1 and gi = Gi1 + Gi2 − 1. Then, the constraints f3i = fi and
g3i = gi are automatically satisfied. When Fi1 = 0, Fi2 = 1 and Fi1 = 1, Fi2 = 0, we both have fi = 0.
To avoid this redundance, we add an extra equations Fi1Fi2 − Fi2. We have 2df =
∑N−1
i=0 f
2
i + 1 =∑N−1
i=0 (Fi1 + Fi2 − 1)2 + 1 =
∑N−1
i=0 (Fi1 − Fi2) + N + 1 (mod (F 2i1 − Fi1, F 2i2 − fi2, Fi1Fi2 − Fi2)).
Similarly, dg =
∑N−1
i=0 (Gi1 − Gi2) + N (mod (G2i1 − Gi1, G2i2 − Gi2, Gi1Gi2 − Gi2)). Then, F1 is
equivalent to
F11 = {
N−1∑
i=0
(Fi1 − Fi2) +N + 1− 2df ,
N−1∑
i=0
(Gi1 −Gi2) +N − 2dg,
N−1∑
i=0
(Fi1 + Fi2 − 1)− 1,
N−1∑
i=0
(Gi1 +Gi2 − 1),
Fi1Fi2 − Fi2, Gi1Gi2 −Gi2, i = 0, . . . , N − 1,⊂ C[Fbit]}, (47)
where Fbit = {Fij , Gij | i = 0, . . . , N − 1; j = 1, 2}.
We can compute B(F2) ⊂ Zp[Xbit] and B(F3) ⊂ Zp[Xbit] defined in (6) by setting qi =
θq−1(Qi0, . . . , Qi⌊log2(q−1)⌋) and pi = θp−1(Pi0, . . . , Pi⌊log2(p−1)⌋), where
Xbit = {Fi1, Fi2, Gi1, Gi2 | i = 0, . . . , N − 1}∪
{Pij | i = 0, . . . , N − 1, j = 0, . . . , ⌊log2(p− 1)⌋}∪
{Qij | i = 0, . . . , N − 1, j = 0, . . . , ⌊log2(q − 1)⌋}
Note that F2 and F3 are already MQ, we can compute P (F2) and P (F3) as in (9). Therefore, we
can use algorithm QBoolSol to find a Boolean solution Xˇ for
FNTRU = F11 ∪ P (F2) ∪ P (F3) ⊂ C[Xbit].
Finally set fˇi = Fˇi1 + Fˇi2 − 1, and we have a possible private key fˇ = (fˇ0, . . . , fˇN−1).
Proposition 9.1. There is a quantum algorithm to obtain a private key f from the public key h in
time O˜(N4.5 log4.5 qκ2 log 1/ǫ) with probability ≥ 1− ǫ, where κ is the condition number for FNTRU.
Proof. Only the complexity need to be considered. TF2 = 2N2+N+1, TF3 = N2+1, TF11 = O(N).
By Lemma 3.3 and Corollary 3.4, TP (F2) = O(N
2 log2 q), TP (F3) = O(N
2 log2 p), and then we have
TFNTRU = O(N
2(log2 q+log2 p)) = O(N2 log2 q) and NFNTRU = O(N log q+N logN+N log log q) =
O˜(N log q) by Lemma 3.3, where we can ignore p considering p≪ q. By Theorem 3.6, we can obtain
a possible private key f in time O˜(N4.5 log4.5 qκ2 log 1/ǫ).
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In the design of NTRU, it is assumed that the size of f and g are small. We can use the methods
given in Section 6.1 to find f and g which have the smallest df + dg.
Proposition 9.2. There is a quantum algorithm to obtain a private key f from the public key h
such that df + dg is minimal in time O˜(N
4.5 log4.5 qκ2 log 1/ǫ) with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ, where κ is
the extended condition number for FNTRU.
Proof. Remove
∑N−1
i=0 (Fi1 −Fi2) +N +1− 2df and
∑N−1
i=0 (Gi1 −Gi2) +N − 2dg from F1 and still
denote FNTRU = F1∪F2∪F3. We can use the objective function o = (2df −1−N)+2dg−N −1 =∑N−1
i=0 (Fi1 − Fi2 + Gi1 − Fi2) − 1 which satisfies 0 ≤ o < 4N . Following (18), we have δαβ =
α+
∑β−1
j=0 Ej2
j−o and Lαβ = FNTRU∪{δαβ} ⊂ C[Xbit,Ebit]. Then we can use Algorithm 5.3 to find
a private key f which minimizes o. By the proof of Proposition 9.1, we have TFNTRU = O(N
2 log2 q)
and NFNTRU = O(N log q). Then, TLαβ = O˜(N
2 log2 q) and NLαβ = O(N log q). By Theorem 5.4,
the complexity is O˜(N4.5 log4.5 qκ2 log 1/ǫ logN) = O˜(N4.5 log4.5 qκ2 log 1/ǫ).
For the parameters recommended in [19], (N, p, q) = (107, 3, 64), (N, p, q) = (167, 3, 128),
(N, p, q) = (503, 3, 256), and ǫ = 1%, the complexities in Proposition 9.2 is given in the follow-
ing table.
N q p Complexity
107 64 3 245κ2
167 128 3 249κ2
503 256 3 257κ2
Table 1: Complexities of the quantum algebraic attack on NTRU
In Table 1, κ is the condition number of the corresponding equation systems. From the table,
this main part of the complexity is relatively low comparing to its desired security 3N if κ is small,
which implies that the NTRU is safe only if its condition number is large.
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we give quantum algorithms for two basic computational problems: polynomial system
solving over a finite field and the optimization problem where the arguments either take values from
a finite field or are bounded integers. The complexities of these quantum algorithms are polynomial
in the input size, the maximal degree of the inequality constraints, and κ which is the condition
number of certain matrices derived from the problem. So, we achieve exponential speedup for these
problems when the condition number is small.
The optimization problem considered in this paper covers many NP-hard problems as special
cases. In particular, the proposed algorithms are used to give quantum algorithms for several fun-
damental computational problems in cryptography, including the polynomial system with noise, the
short solution problem, the shortest vector problem, and the NTRU cryptosystem. The complexity
for all of these problems is polynomial in the input size and their condition numbers, which means
that these problems are difficult to solve by a quantum computer if and only if their condition
numbers are large. As a consequence, the NTRU cryptosystem as well as the candidates recently
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proposed for post-quantum standard of public key cryptosystems [4] are safe against quantum com-
puter attacks only if the condition number of its equation system is large.
The main idea of the algorithm is to convert the equality and inequality constraints of the
optimization problem into polynomial equations in Boolean variables and then convert the finding
of the minimal value of the objective function into several problems of finding the Boolean solutions
for polynomial systems over C, that is B-POSSO. Then the quantum algorithm from [12] is used to
find Boolean solutions for these polynomial systems.
As we just mentioned that the optimization problem is reduced into the B-POSSO problem. It is
interesting to give a description for all the problems that can be efficiently reduced to B-POSSO. It
is also interesting to see whether it is possible to combine the reduction methods introduced in this
paper with traditional algorithms for polynomial system solving such as the Gro¨benr basis method
[3] and the characteristic set method [15] to obtain better traditional algorithms for polynomial
system solving and optimization over finite fields. Finally, in order to know the exact complexity
of the algorithm proposed in this paper, we need to know the condition number, which is a main
future problem for study.
References
[1] Ajtai, M., Generating hard instances of lattice problems, STOC’96, 99-108, ACM Press, 1996.
[2] Albrecht, M.R. and Cid, C., Cold boot key recovery by solving polynomial systems with noise,
ACNS, 57-72, 2011.
[3] Albrecht, M.R., Cid, C., Fauge´re, J.C., Fitzpatrick, R., Perret, L., Algebraic algorithms for
LWE problems. Inria hal-01072721, 2014.
[4] Albrecht M.R., Curtis B.R., Deo A., Davidson, A., Player R., Postlethwaite E.W., Virdia F.
and Wunderer T., Estimate all the {LWE, NTRU} schemes!. In: Catalano D., De Prisco R.
(eds) Security and Cryptography for Networks. SCN 2018. LNCS, vol 11035. Springer, Cham.
[5] Ambainis, A., Variable time amplitude amplification and a faster quantum algorithm for solving
systems of linear equations, Proc. STACS, 636-647, 2012.
[6] Aono Y., Nguyen P.Q., Shen Y., Quantum lattice enumeration and tweaking discrete pruning,
https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/546, 2018.
[7] Arora, S. and Ge, R., New algorithms for learning in presence of errors, ICALP, LNCS 6755,
L. Aceto, M. Henzinger, and J. Sgall, editors, 403-415, Springer Verlag, 2011.
[8] Balas E., An additive algorithm for solving linear programs with zero-one cariables. INFORMS,
1965.
[9] Berlekamp, E.R., McEliece, R.J., van Tilborg, H.C.A., On the inherent intractability of certain
coding problems, IEEE Trans. on Information Theory, 24(3), 384-386, 1978.
[10] Blum, A., Kalai, A., Wasserman, H., Noise-tolerant learning, the parity problem, and the
statistical query model, Journal of the ACM, 50(4) 506-519, 2003.
29
[11] Bryant, R. Graph-based algorithm for Boolean function manipulation, IEEE Transactions on
Computing, C-35, 677-691, 1986.
[12] Chen Y.A. and Gao, X.S., Quantum algorithms for Boolean equation solving and quantum
algebraic attack on cryptosystems, ArXiv1712.06239, 2017.
[13] Childs, A.M., Kothari, R., Somma, R.D., Quantum algorithm for systems of linear equations
with exponentially improved dependence on precision, SIAM J. Comput., 46(6), 1920-1950,
2017.
[14] Ding, J., Gower, J.E., Schmidt, D.S., Multivariate Public Key Cryptosystems, Springer, 2006.
[15] Gao, X.S. and Huang, Z., Characteristic set algorithms for equation solving in finite fields,
Journal of Symbolic Computation, 47, 655-679, 2012.
[16] Genova K. and Guliashki V., Linear integer programming methods and approaches - a survey,
Cybernetics and Information Technologies, 11(1) , 2011
[17] H˚astad, J., Some optimal inapproximability results, Journal of the ACM, 48, 798-859, 2009.
[18] Harrow, A.W., Hassidim, A., Lloyd, S., Quantum algorithm for linear systems of equations.
Physical Review Letters, 103(15), 150502, 2009.
[19] Hoffstein, J., Pipher, J., Silverman, J.H., NTRU: A ring-based public key cryptosystem, Algo-
rithmic Number Theory, ANTS’98, LNCS 1423, 267-288, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1998.
[20] Huang, Z. and Lin, D., Solving polynomial systems with noise over F2: revisited, Theoretical
Computer Science, 676, 52-68, 2017.
[21] Kadowaki, T. and Nishimori, H., Quantum annealing in the transverse Ising model, Phys. Rev.
E, 58, 5355-5363, 1998.
[22] Karp, R.M., Reducibility among combinatorial problems. Complexity of Computer Computa-
tions, 85-103, 1972.
[23] Laarhoven, T., Sieving for shortest vectors in lattices using angular locality-sensitive hashing,
Proc. CRYPTO 2015 -Part I, Vol. 9215, LNCS, Springer, 2015.
[24] Peikert, C., Public-key cryptosystems from the worst-case shortest vector problem,
STOC2009), 333-342, 2009.
[25] Regev, O., On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptography. In Harold
N. Gabow and Ronald Fagin, editors, 37th ACM STOC, 84C93, 2005.
[26] Shewchuk, J.R., An introduction to the conjugate gradient method without the agonizingpain,
Tech. Rep. CMU-CS-94-125, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 1994.
[27] Storjohann, A., Algorithms for matrix canonical forms, PhD Thesis, Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology, 2000.
[28] J. von zur Gathen and J. Gerhard, “Modern Computer Algebra,” Cambridge University Press,
1999.
30
[29] Yap, C.K., Fundamental Problems of Algorithmic Algebra, Oxford Press, 2000.
[30] Zhao, S.W. and Gao, X.S., Minimal achievable approximation ratio for MAX-MQ in finite
fields, Theoretical Computer Science, 410, 2285-2290, 2009.
31
